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The current debate over campaign finance reform typically
overlooks a compelling reason why such reform is important:
equality of political participation. American representative
democracy, the Constitution and its Amendments embrace the
principle of equality of political participation. Specifically, there
are very important lessons to be learned by reconsidering several
revolutionary Supreme Court decisions in the context of campaign
finance reform today.
In the early 1960s, the Court declared constitutional
principles for dealing with challenges to voting patterns and
redistricting.1 While the Voting Cases are best known for their
articulation of the one-person, one-vote doctrine, 2 seen as a whole,
they do far more than delineate a formula for the proper drawing
of political districts. In these cases, the Court spoke about the
broad and deep roots of political equality in the United States.
The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause served as
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1. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
Collectively, I will refer to these cases as the "Voting Cases."
2. See, e.g., Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568; Lucas, 377
U.S. at 736; Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
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the legal basis of the decisions, but the Court also considered the
nature of the republic itself, the structure of Congress, and the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. 3 The Court made clear
that political power is not to be concentrated in the hands of the
few; through the electoral process, all should have a chance to
participate on an equal basis.4 The Constitution and the nation's
history demand nothing less.
This Article does not focus exclusively on the specific theme
of malapportionment, which can be said to be largely a problem of
the past. However, a fundamental problem lingers in a slightly
different form today, as political power is concentrated in the
hands of the wealthy.5 In effect, the modern concentration of
power is the flip side of the vote dilution coin addressed in the
1960s. The law typically has not considered this approach to the
problem, instead focusing on a limited First Amendment analysis,
fears of corruption, and market analogies. 6 Such analysis does not
recognize the constitutional importance of equality in the political
process. The 2003 decision in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission7 seems to offer a new opportunity to reconsider the
direction of the prevailing analysis. In this Article, I propose that
we apply the Voting Cases and their declaration of equality to
campaign finance reform analysis.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part I will begin with a
brief review of vote dilution through the historical lens of the
Voting Cases.8 Next, this Article will explore modern vote dilution
through the current state of money and politics in America. 9
Specifically, I will discuss the ways in which the current system of
political campaigns and governance concentrates power in the
hands of the few-those with access to large sums of campaign
cash. A brief review of the current law of campaign finance reform
3. My focus will be almost entirely on the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments, but I occasionally will use the 'Voting Amendments" to refer to the
collection of vote-related amendments, i.e., the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments,
4. See infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 35-103 and accompanying text. In this article, I will talk
about the wealthy as a shorthand for wealthy individuals, and for those who have
access to others with wealth who are willing to make major campaign
contributions.
6. See infra notes 115-152 and accompanying text.
7. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). This widely-anticipated decision reviewed and upheld
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002) [hereinafter BCRA].
8. See infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 35-103 and accompanying text.
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will follow.10
Part II explores the doctrinal development of vote dilution,
starting with a review of the Court's legal analysis in the Voting
Cases, where the principle of equality was pulled from within the
pages of the Constitution and the nation's history.1 1 I will then
discuss how the Voting Amendments speak to principles of
equality of participation in the political process. 12 Finally, Part II
will review the themes of popular sovereignty, republican
government, and representative democracy as reflected in the
structure of the United States government and Article I of the
United States Constitution. 3 In the end, we will have a clear
picture of the commitment to equality of political participation.
After illustrating in Part II the commitment to equality and
the fundamental aversion to concentration of power, I will argue in
Part III that we need to focus on the political equality that resides
in the Constitution and was articulated by the Court four decades
ago.' 4 Before concluding, the Article will explore the implications
of re-conceiving the field in this manner. 15
Above all, the goal is to link the Voting Cases and their
rejection of concentrated power with the problems of campaign
finance reform today. Political equality is essential and
fundamental; this new approach can help break up the
concentration of power in the hands of the wealthy few and
redistribute political power to the many.
I. Money, Access, and Concentration of Power: Modern
Vote Dilution
In the 1960s, vote dilution took the form of redistricting and
voting patterns, which concentrated power into the hands of the
few. Today, money in politics has concentrated power and access
in the hands of the wealthy few, creating a modern sort of vote
dilution.' 6  As the wealthy gain power, they attain greater
representation; in effect, there is a multi-member district for those
with access to money. The flip side of the coin is that the average
voter is denied equal participation in the political-governmental
process-this is modern vote dilution. Unfortunately, current
10. See infra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 115-152 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 153-202 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 203-227 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 228-246 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 247-282 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 35-103 and accompanying text.
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campaign finance reform analysis does not consider this
perspective.
A. Historical Vote Dilution: Malapportionment
The Supreme Court addressed vote dilution in the first half of
the 1960s in the form of challenges to voting patterns and
redistricting. 17 The Voting Cases established that the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause demanded both equality of
representation and equality of participation in the selection of
representatives. Applying equality principles to the reality of
malapportionment in state governments, the Court spoke
forcefully about the Constitution's rejection of diluted and/or
concentrated power.'5 A brief review of these cases follows, while
their doctrinal basis will be explored further in Part II.
1. Gray v. Sanders
In Gray v. Sanders, 9 voters challenged the Georgia "county
unit" system, which was used in statewide primary elections. 20
While each person was entitled to one vote, the votes were tallied
by county, and each county was weighed by units, not strictly
according to population.21 As a result, rural counties with smaller
populations had concentrated power, often equal to an urban
county with a far greater population. The votes of citizens in rural
regions were concentrated to 99 times the strength of the urban
dwellers. 22 The Court found that this concentration of power in
17. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
18. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568:
We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection
Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an
individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.
Id.
19. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
20. Id. at 370.
21. Id. at 371-72.
22. Id. at 371 ("[Olne resident in Echols County had an influence in the
nomination of candidates equivalent to 99 residents of Fulton County."); see also
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562:
If a State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State
should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of
citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right
to vote of those residing in disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.
[Vol. 23:239
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the hands of the few violated the constitutional mandate of
equality. 23 This was the first step in establishing the one-person,
one-vote principle.
2. Wesberry v. Sanders
In Wesberry v. Sanders,24 Georgia's congressional districting
resulted in some districts being less than half or less than a third
as large as others, each with the same congressional
representation. 25 The Court held that "as nearly as is practicable
one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much
as another's .... To say that a vote is worth more in one district
than in another would ... run counter to our fundamental ideas of
democratic government .... "26 From this perspective on American
government, the Court stressed the importance of "complete
equality"27 and struck the Georgia plan. 28
3. Reynolds v. Sims
In Reynolds v. Sims, 29 the Court confronted a badly
malapportioned legislature and a corresponding challenge to
Alabama's legislative districting with geographically-driven
districts based on the 1900 census.30 Since the population had
shifted over many decades, the rural counties had markedly fewer
residents, but maintained the same number of representatives in
Id.
23. Gray, 372 U.S. at 379-80.
24. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
25. Id. at 2. The complaint in Wesberry alleged that voters were deprived of the
full benefit of their right to vote, in violation of Art. I, Section 2, of the Constitution.
Id. at 3. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States ... ").
26. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8-9. Arguably, after adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, the same statement can be made about the Senate. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII.
27. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14.
28. Id. at 8-9. In Wesberry, voters challenged the lines drawn to create
congressional districts in Georgia that had resulted in disparate populations.
Because smaller districts had equal congressional representation as larger ones,
there was a concentration of power in the lesser-populated districts. Id. at 2.
"[I]nequality of population means that the Fifth District's Congressman has to
represent from two to three times as many people as do Congressmen from some of
the other Georgia districts." Id.
29. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
30. The legislature consisted of a 35-member Senate and a 106-member House
of Representatives. Id. at 537-38. Senate districts ranged in population from
15,417 to 634,864 and the House had districts with populations ranging from
31,175 to 634,864. Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 440-41 (D.C. Ala. 1962).
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government. 3 1 The effect was that the few had concentrated
power, and the many had diluted power. The few with power
withstood efforts to change the status quo from which they
benefited. This is perhaps the best known of the Voting Cases,
and it clearly established the equality-based rationale for one-
person, one-vote: "[T]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of
state legislators."32
These Voting Cases established a new standard for resolving
the imbalance of power in politics and government.3 3 The Court
established that vote dilution and concentration of power are
incompatible with the Constitution's command of equality.
B. Modern Vote Dilution: Money and Concentrated Power
Those who can give and/or raise large sums of money are
extraordinarily important to candidates and campaigns. Elections
are growing costlier by leaps and bounds, and because elections for
the House of Representatives and the Senate are privately
financed, voters who can most efficiently raise large sums have a
special value. Thus, the wealthy have special access and
influence; power is concentrated in the hands of the few who
control money. After the campaigns, the wealthy wield inordinate
power, enjoying access to elected officials that others do not.34
1. Money is Key in Winning Elections
First, consider the costs of campaigns and the way in which
funds are raised. Campaigns cost tens of millions of dollars, and
the amounts are increasing rapidly. In the 2000 election cycle,
31. Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276, 279 (D.C. Ga. 1962).
32. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566 (emphasis added). The Reynolds Court also
wrote:
And the concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as
requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation
to the governmental action questioned or challenged. With respect to the
allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of a State,
stand in the same relation regardless of where they live.
Id.
33. See also WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 654 (1964) (holding that
"[h]owever complicated or sophisticated an apportionment scheme might be, it
cannot, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, result in a significant
undervaluation of the weight of the votes of certain of a State's citizens merely
because of where they happen to reside"); Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly of
Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964) (noting that "[a]n individual's constitutionally
protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of
a majority of the state's electorate"). See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part I.B.3.
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approximately $4 billion was spent on campaigns.35 Congressional
campaign expenditures, in constant dollars, have more than
tripled, rising from $318.5 million to just over $1 billion from 1972
to 2000.36 There is a strong correlation between money spent and
electoral success,3 7 which prompts more and more spending, at an
ever-increasing rate. "[T]he cost of a competitive House race has
doubled during the past decade," and competitive Senate races
have increased by 25 to 50 percent. 38 The 2004 race for United
States Senator in South Dakota provides a recent glaring example,
as the two candidates raised a total of approximately $37 million 39
for a state with a population of 764,309.40 It seems that
everywhere you turn, a new record for spending is being set, with
no end in sight.
Because House and Senate races are not funded publicly,41
these amounts must come from private contributions. But as the
costs have soared, it is harder and harder for campaigns to keep
up. Because of the need for such large sums of money, the
wealthiest contributors are perhaps the most important people in
modern politics. Under the Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA"),42 individuals can contribute up to $2000 to an individual
candidate's campaign in the primary season and another $2000 in
the general election.43 The more that people can write checks of
$1000 or $2000 at a time, the more efficiently the campaign's goals
can be reached. Accordingly, power, access, and attention flow to
people based on their access to money instead of the people
represented, constituency spoken for, or ideology espoused.
35. Candice J. Nelson, Spending in the 2000 Elections, in FINANCING THE 2000
ELECTION 24, 45 (David B. Magleby ed., 2002).
36. Id. at 29. While any given election cycle may show an increase or decrease,
looking at the data decade-to-decade shows constant increases. Id.
37. Id. at 30.
38. Id. The cost of running a competitive Senate race has gone from between
approximately $3.5 and $4 million to approximately $5 million. Id.
39. Total Raised and Spent: 2004 Race: South Dakota Senate, Opensecrets.org,
at http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.asp?cycle=2004&id=SDS1 (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005).
40. South Dakota QuickFacts, U.S. Census Bureau, available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/46000.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
41. The presidential election is publicly funded and there is partial public
financing for the presidential primaries. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund
(PECF), Federal Election Commission, at http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.html
(last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
42. 86 Stat. 11 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (main ed. and Supp.
2003)).
43. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2002) [hereinafter
FECA].
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Conversely, the individual contributor who cannot give $2000
becomes less and less meaningful in the high-money game.44
The 2004 presidential elections were highly instructive. 45
The George W. Bush re-election campaign set up a special system,
as the President opted out of the public match financing of the
campaign. 46 During the Bush campaign, those who pledged to
raise $200,000 were in a special club called the "Rangers," with
each person typically targeting one hundred people to "max out,"
i.e., give the maximum $2000 contribution47 The "Pioneers" was
44. The same applies to an individual contributor who could only give $1000
under the law before BCRA was recently amended to allow contributors to give up
to $2000. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
45. While the financing system for the presidential race differs in some respects
from House and Senate races, in part they share a common bond of private funding.
House and Senate races are privately financed in both primaries and the general
election; presidential primaries are funded in whole, or at least in large part, by
private money as well.
46. On the Democratic Party side, Howard Dean and John Kerry also opted out.
An article in the Washington Post noted:
Two Democratic presidential candidates, Howard Dean and John Kerry,
have decided not to accept federal campaign subsidies. Both say they
cannot compete with President Bush-who also has opted out of the public
campaign financing system-if they accept the matching funds and the
spending restrictions that go along with them.
If the System Were Different, Sure, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2003, at B4; see also Ceci
Connolly, Kerry Spurs Ambitious Fundraising: Democratic Front-Runner Seeks to
Offset Bush's $100 Million, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2004, at Al, A7.
It has become a clich6 to characterize campaigns as the most expensive
ever. But what makes the 2004 contest unique is that the two major party
candidates will be able to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money.
That is because for the first time since Congress enacted campaign finance
laws in 1974, both the Republican and the Democrat have opted out of the
public financing system in the pre-convention season, choosing to reject
taxpayer dollars in favor of the much larger sums they expect to raise on
their own.
Id.
47. Thomas B. Edsall & Sarah Cohen, Bush Campaign Raises a Record $49.5
Million; For Their Efforts, Fundraisers Also Gain, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at
Al.
President Bush's reelection campaign yesterday reported raising $49.5
million in the third quarter, a decisive record for a three-month period.
Since launching his fundraising effort in May, Bush has collected $83.9
million.
The record receipts-more than triple the top Democrat's fundraising for
the quarter-were driven in large part by just 285 men and women, who
collected $38.5 million or more, which was at least 45 percent of Bush's
total take. This fundraising elite, many of whom were beneficiaries of
Bush administration policies, included 100 "Rangers," who raised at least
$200,000 apiece, and 185 "Pioneers," who collected at least $100,000 each.
Id. On the Democratic side, Senator John Kerry apparently had identified key
fundraisers who could raise very large sums as well. See Connolly, supra note 46,
at Al ("For now, the Kerry team is cultivating the cadre of Democratic fundraisers
with the ability to collect $50,000 and $100,000 apiece from their networks.").
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another group, established in the 2000 election cycle, when the
contribution ceiling was $1000, whose members could raise
$100,000 each (presumably finding one hundred people who gave
$1000 each). 48 The results were nothing short of phenomenal, as
President Bush raised $271.6 million in individual contributions
for the primary elections, 49 an amazing sum in its own right, made
all the more so when considering the fact that he faced no real
Republican primary opposition. The sums are staggering. The
question is: where did the funding come from? Most-some 57
percent-was raised in amounts of $1000 or more.50 Thus, power
is concentrated in the hands of Rangers and Pioneers.
51
The power is even more concentrated now than before. In
particular, while the McCain-Feingold law52 has been heralded as
48. Edsall & Cohen, supra note 47, at Al; see also John C. Green & Nathan S.
Bigelow, The 2000 Presidential Nominations: The Costs of Innovation, in
FINANCING THE 2000 ELECTION 59 (David Magleby ed., 2002). The amount raised
by the Pioneers in 2000 was extraordinary: "IThis figure was roughly equal to the
number of $1,000 donations raised by all other major party candidates combined
and was nearly three times larger than all such donations to the other GOP
candidates." Id. at 61. Al Gore and Bill Bradley had similar percentages, but
dramatically smaller gross receipts than Bush: Gore raised $21.8 million in $1000
contributions, marking 61 percent of his fundraising; Bradley raised $19.1 million
this way, marking 63 percent of his net. Id. at 70. John McCain had a very
different distribution, with nearly equal total amounts in $1000 donations as from
donations in the under $200 range. Id. at 62. Gary Bauer, Alan Keyes, and Bob
Smith all raised most of their money in sums under $200, largely via direct mail
solicitation. Id. at 62, 63.
49. Presidential Candidate George W. Bush Campaign Money, Opensecrets.org,
at http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/summary.asp?ID=NOOO080 7 2  (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005). This far outpaced his own remarkable goal of raising $170
to $200 million. See, e.g., Dean Will Have to Quadruple Fundraising Rate to Match
Bush Totals, BULLETIN's FRONTRUNNER, Jan. 7, 2004 ("Bush's fundraising target
during the primary season [is]-$170 million to $200 million .... "). John Kerry
lagged only slightly, raising nearly $225 million in individual contributions.
Presidential Candidate John Kerry, Opensecrets.org, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/presidential/summary.asp?ID=NO000024 5 (last visited
Mar. 26, 2005).
50. Presidential Fundraising from Individual Contributions, The Campaign
Finance Institute, available at http://www.cfinst.org/pr/pdf/100404_Table3.pdf (last
visited Mar. 26, 2005).
51. I will speak often of Rangers and Pioneers as a shorthand, but of course
there are many people who raise large sums of money for all candidates. Note as
well that the Democrats also raised money in amounts that are tilted toward the
person who maxes out. For example, John Edwards raised 70 percent of his funds
in contributions of $1000 or more, as compared to 14 percent of $200 or less; for
Richard Gephardt, the figures were 71 percent and 13 percent respectively; for Joe
Lieberman, 74 percent and 9 percent respectively. Howard Dean was notably
different from the other major Democratic candidates, with 19 percent of his money
from the largest contributions and 60 percent from the smallest. Id.
52. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
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the most far-reaching campaign finance reform in a generation, 53
it has also increased the concentration of power in the hands of the
few. The law raised contribution limits from $1000 to $2000 per
person, per election cycle,54 so that an individual who wants to
max out now can donate $4000 to a candidate over a primary-
general election cycle.5 5 With the contribution levels doubled,
candidates can raise more and spend more with the assistance of
fewer people. 56 This inevitably will further concentrate power in
the hands of the wealthy. 57 President Bush's fundraising strategy
gave voice to this concentration. In 2000, the Pioneers existed
with the same goal, and in 2004 Bush added the Rangers. 58 With
the higher limits, President Bush doubled the goals for the
wealthiest; with the new $2000 contribution caps, the same 100
people who max out could give him twice as much money as in the
2000 election-and over 60,000 people maxed out, accounting for
nearly half of all money raised.5 9 More money raised by the same
number of people further concentrates the power in the hands of
the few.
2. The Power of Unregulated Money
So far, this Article has analyzed "hard money," contributions
to campaigns regulated by FECA limits, 60 but hard money does not
pay for all the political spending that fuels campaigns. In order to
understand why, we first must understand the current
constitutional constraints on regulation, as most notably defined
by Buckley v. Valeo,61 which reviewed FECA's basic structure of
campaign regulation. To summarize, Buckley struck down
expenditure limits but upheld contribution limits. 62 But think for
53. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Campaign Finance Law Is Upheld: Supreme Court
Says Strict Rules Are Justified, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11, 2003, at Al (noting BCRA
incorporates the "most sweeping curbs ever on private money in national politics").
54. FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2002). This provision was upheld in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 152 (2003).
55. Or, a couple can max out by giving $8000-$4000 for each person.
56. For example, a Senate race that costs $8 million for both the primary and
general election would have required, at a minimum, 4000 people. The same
fundraising can be done with 2000 people-half as many-today.
57. See, e.g., Spencer A. Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance,
Democracy, and Participation, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 73 (2004).
58. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
59. 2004 Donor Demographics, Opensecrets.org, at http://www.opensecrets.org/
presidentialIdonordems.asp?filter=A&sortby=2 (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
60. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003).
61. 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see infra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 23 ("[A]lthough the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations
both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings
[Vol. 23:239248
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a moment of any business whose expenses rise but whose income
remains relatively flat.63 As candidates have wanted to spend
more and more money, individual contributions have not been able
to keep pace. As a result, those with money have found ways to
support campaigns through what is called "soft money"-large
unregulated sums given by the wealthiest, typically to the political
parties, then used to support the candidates.6 4 In effect there is
now what Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy has called
"covert" money 65 flowing in large sums outside the reach of
regulation. Now, not only do the wealthiest stand out because
they contribute $2000 or $4000 to an individual candidate, but
they really stand out by giving tens or hundreds of thousands of
dollars-or perhaps even millions-to a political party or group
which is used to help the party, the group, and the candidate.
These sums spent on behalf of, but technically outside of, the
candidates' campaigns became so large in 2000 that "for the first
time in recent history, political advertising by parties and groups
outnumbered political ads by candidates in the presidential
general election."66  The wealthiest of the wealthy gave nearly
impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political
expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions."). The
Court also upheld public financing of presidential elections and disclosure
requirements. Id. at 58, 67-68.
63. An interesting Note explores campaign financing, employing a supply-and-
demand model analysis. See Justin A. Nelson, The Supply and Demand of
Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 524 (2000). The author asks, "if
the supply side cannot work by itself, what then are we left with? A reform
strategy focusing on the demand side while still retaining a modicum of supply-side
limits presents the best chance of comprehensive and attainable reform." Id. at
526.
64. See also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-26 (discussing development and growth
of soft money). Further, the FEC has issued advisory opinions that have expanded
the permissible uses of soft money. See, e.g., FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25 (1995)
(allowing use of soft money to defray the costs of 'legislative advocacy media
advertisements,' even if the ads mentioned the name of a federal candidate, so long
as they did not expressly advocate the candidate's election or defeat).
65. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 406
(2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he compromise the Court invented in Buckley
set the stage for a new kind of political speech to enter the political system. It is
covert speech. The Court has forced a substantial amount of political speech
underground, as contributors and candidates devise ever more elaborate methods
of avoiding contribution limits ....").
66. Craig B. Holman, A Narrow and Appropriate Response to Cloaked
Electioneering: Measuring the Impact of the 60-Day Bright-Line Test on Issue
Advocacy, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW 2, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/
hill memo_0301.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2005). The sums are often spent on
perhaps the most important component of modern campaigns-television
advertisements. One extensive survey found that "[t]here were 940,755 airings of
250 Law and Inequality [Vol. 23:239
$500 million to the major parties in the 2000 election cycle in soft
money. 67 The money-and power-is even further concentrated.
Of that nearly one half billion dollars in party soft money, about
62 percent came from only 800 donors; "fifty corporations, unions,
and individuals each contributed more than $1 million in soft
money."68
McCain-Feingold banned much soft money,69 and that ban
was upheld in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.70
Arguably, this will have the salutary effect of reducing soft money
spending that is covert. But, as the Court admonished at the end
of the McConnell opinion, "money, like water, will always find an
outlet. What problems will arise, and how Congress will respond,
are concerns for another day."71 The money will indeed find an
outlet; and the power will remain concentrated in the hands of the
few, such as the Rangers and the Pioneers.
The rise of so-called "527 organizations" in the 2004
presidential election further illuminates this problem.7 2 After the
2004 election cycle, we are quite familiar with 527s like Swift Boat
Vets and P.O.W.s for Truth 73 and MoveOn.org Voter Fund,74
operating outside of the structure of regulated contributions and
political television commercials over the 2000 calendar year in the nation's top 75
media markets-at a total cost of $672,045,453." Id.
67. Thomas E. Mann, Lessons for Reformers, in FINANCING THE 2000 ELECTION
248 (David Magleby ed., 2002) ("In the 2000 election cycle about $300 million of the
$487 million in party soft money came from only 800 donors.").
68. Id.
69. See FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 441i (2002).
70. 540 U.S. 93, 173 (2003).
71. Id. at 224. The opinion mysteriously fails to cite an important recent article
that proposed just such an analogy, and which develops the point very well. See
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
72. Quick Answers to General Questions: What Is a 527 Organization?, Federal
Election Commission, available at http://www.fec.gov/anslanswers.shtml (last
visited Mar. 26, 2005). The FEC defines 527s as:
Entities organized under section 527 of the tax code [which] are considered
"political organizations," defined generally as a party, committee or
association that is organized and operated primarily for the purpose of
influencing the selection, nomination or appointment of any individual to
any federal, state or local public office, or office in a political organization.
All political committees that register and file reports with the FEC are 527
organizations, but not all 527 organizations are required to file with the
FEC. Some file reports with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Id.
73. Swift Boat Vets and P.O.W.s for Truth, at www.swiftvets.com (last visited
Feb. 20, 2005).
74. Voter Fund, MoveOn.org, at www.moveon.org/voterfund (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
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expenditures. 75 In the 2004 cycle, they spent over $550 million, 76
and they had a clear impact on the course of the election. 77 By
force of their money, 527 organizations also keep disproportionate
power in the hands of the few. 78
3. Money Begets Access
The few who control the financing get much in return; not
only are they lavished with attention during the campaign, they
get special access and power when the candidates they support are
in office. The recent litigation in the McConnell case provided full
exposure to the system. Judge Kollar-Kotelly, on the three-judge
panel that first heard the case,79 summarized:
The record demonstrates that large donations ... to the
political parties provide donors with access to Members of
Congress. The record is a treasure trove of testimony from
Members of Congress, individual and corporate donors, and
lobbyists, as well as documentary evidence, establishing that
contributions ... are given with the expectation they will
provide the donor with access to influence federal officials,
that this expectation is fostered by the national parties, and
that this expectation is often realized.80
Similarly, Judge Leon provided a detailed account with a heading
that says it all: "Party Donation Programs Show that Increased
Access Corresponds with Larger Donations."81  These judicial
75. The Major Players Active Advocacy Groups in the 2004 Election Cycle,
Opensecrets.org, at http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527grps.asp (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
76. 527s in 2004 Shatter Previous Records for Political Fundraising, The Center
for Public Integrity, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/report.aspx?
aid=435&sid=300 (last visited Feb. 20, 2005). The amount has skyrocketed in
recent years from $149.4 million in 2000 to $285.4 million in 2002. Id.
77. See, e.g., id.; Michael Janofsky, Advocacy Groups Spent Record Amount on
2004 Election, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at A25. I do not suggest that they turned
the election toward one candidate or the other. I suggest instead that they were a
dominant force across the country, across the political spectrum.
78. The top 25 individual contributors gave between $2 million and $23.45
million to 527s. Top Individual Contributors to 527 Committees: 2004 Election
Cycle, Opensecrets.org, at http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527indivs.asp?cycle
=2004 (last visited Mar. 28, 2005). Organizations, corporations, and other groups
likewise gave in the tens of millions of dollars. See 527 Committee Activity: Top 50
Federally Focused Organizations, Opensecrets.org, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
79. McConnell was first heard by a three-judge panel of Judges Henderson,
Kollar-Kotelly, and Leon. The court filed a per curium opinion, Judge Henderson
filed a concurrence in part, dissent in part, and Judges Kollar-Kotelly and Leon
also filed separate opinions. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d
176, 183-84 (D.D.C. 2003).
80. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
81. Id. at 860-64 (opinion of Leon, J.). "The record contains substantial
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opinions provide the most recent, and by far the most thorough,82
record ever compiled, exposing the "special access" that large
donors receive.83 A majority on the panel painstakingly detailed,
in their findings of fact, s4 the two major parties' programs for
ensuring a constant stream of big-dollar soft money contributions,
and they discussed the "special access" that is provided in
exchange. Judge Kollar-Kotelly wrote about the correlation:
[L]arge donations to the political parties... provide these
donors with special access to federal lawmakers. This access
is valued by contributors because access to lawmakers is a
necessary ingredient for influencing the legislative
process .... The political parties take advantage of
contributors' desire for access by structuring their donor
programs so that as donations increase, so do the number and
intimacy of special opportunities to meet with Members of
Congress.8 5
The findings of special access were detailed by the three judge
panel, and the Supreme Court majority opinion favorably cites
Judges Kollar-Kotelly and Leon, and then decries this "pervasive"
"access peddling."8 6  Even opponents of campaign finance
regulation understand that campaign contributions buy access.8 7
For example, in oral argument in McConnell, Justice Scalia, who
probative evidence that donors ... receive greater access, both in the amount of
time they spend with federal officeholders and in the priority with which their
interests are accorded in comparison to nondonors." Id. at 856.
82. See id. at 176-950. The record spanned 770 pages. See id.
83. Id. at 488-89 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
84. Judge Henderson, the one judge on the panel who disagreed, conceded these
findings to be the majority view. See id. at 296 (opinion of Henderson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 488-89 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Judge Leon similarly wrote:
"There is ample evidence.., to support Congress's judgment that the special access
and perceived special influence accorded to those large donors have undermined
the public's confidence in the independence of its elected representatives from those
donors, and thereby giving rise to an appearance of corruption." Id. at 785-86
(opinion of Leon, J.).
86. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 151 (2003) (noting that
"[s]o pervasive is this practice that the six national party committees actually
furnish their own menus of opportunities for access to would-be soft-money donors,
with increased prices reflecting an increased level of access").
87. Other researchers who do not seem to support campaign reform
nevertheless acknowledge that "money buys access, rather than policy directly ....
Campaign contributions are one way to improve the chances of getting to see the
legislator about matters of concern to the group." Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Are
Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual
Consumption? Or '"Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?", at
http://itc.mit.edu/itel/docs/2002/LittleMoney-Politics.pdf (Oct. 2002) (last visited
Mar. 26, 2005).
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consistently opposes campaign reform,88 observed that "members
of Congress are going. . . to give time to people who have given
money... to their campaign."8 9
Further, access may also translate into results. Modifying
his statement just quoted, Justice Scalia distinguished a next level
of influence: "I mean, access is not votes."90  On that count,
however, the evidence suggests a strong correlation. 91  The
88. See, e.g, Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,
533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting); Austin v.
Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 685 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
89. Oral Argument Transcript, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 02-
1674, Sept. 8, 2003, available at http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/
1637/argument-1/transcript (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
90. The full quotation, for purposes of clarity and full disclosure, is, "I mean,
access is not votes. Sure, members of Congress are going-going to give time to
people who have given money to people who have given money to their campaign.
It doesn't mean they are going to vote that way." Id. One researcher has
challenged this argument with a thorough study of campaign contributions and
their effect on regulatory outcomes. See Geoff Edwards, Does Private Money
Influence Regulatory Outcomes? Evidence from the Telecommunications Industry,
Nov. 15, 2003, at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/edwards/papers/Strat%20UNE
.pdf at 30 (last visited Mar. 12, 2005) (arguing that even if contributions do not buy
votes, it would be rash to conclude that they buy nothing). Further, Justice Scalia's
point, in searching for a quid pro quo relationship (as demanded in Buckley),
ignores that there is much more that falls short of bribery that damages the process
of government.
91. Some object to this conclusion, with a recent prevalent example being
Ansolabehere et al., supra note 87. The authors treat campaign contributions as "a
form of political participation and consumption." Id. at 2. They contend that there
is little correlation between political spending and outcomes, and question why
corporations donate at all, because the authors view contributions as an inefficient
investment. While they make several insightful points, these well-regarded
academics fundamentally fail to give full weight to the skew in contributions by
ignoring contribution patterns. They divide the net sum of individual contributions
to campaigns by the entire number of individuals who give. Id. at 7. Thereafter,
they rely on what they consider to be an average contribution of $115. Id. They
ignore the fact that the contribution patterns show a great skew towards very large
contributors on one end, a few small contributors on the other end, and very little
that could be considered "average" in the middle. They conflate the problem by
using the term "average" ambiguously, to signify both some sort of mathematical
meaning and to evince a more common-sense, everyday American meaning, i.e., the
average voter. The 2004 presidential campaign data point out the folly in their
baseline: only 11 percent of both George W. Bush's and John Kerry's contributions
were in amounts less than $200; thus, at most, 11 percent of people have made
what they call average contributions. To the contrary, 84 percent and 78 percent,
respectively, have contributed $1000 or more. See Campaign Finance Institute
Report, supra note 50 (indicating that Democrats and Republicans alike seek out
big-money donors). In other words, these scholars ignore the reality of contribution
patterns in making their case. Further, their study was presented a year before
the McConnell case was decided, which they acknowledge. Ansolabehere et al.,
supra note 86, at 5. Hence, the authors have been unable to respond to the
extensive findings discussed above. Despite these flaws, their insights are
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concentrated power in the hands of the wealthy shapes outcomes
during the legislative process. 92 One recent, thorough study cross-
referenced numerous votes on financial services legislation 93
against contribution patterns by PACs and interest groups, 94
spread from 1991 to 1998.95 The unmistakable conclusion was
that "interest groups 'buy' legislators' votes with PAC
contributions."96 Another study looked at ten congressional votes
on agricultural programs 97 and reached similar conclusions. 98 This
study also found that major donors had the ear of members of
Congress, and that influence resulted in votes and legislative
victories. 99 But for money and the influence it bought, bills would
interesting. Their work is useful to the extent that it challenges the assumption
that money is a good investment. Indeed, their suggestion that political
contributions should be seen as consumption, or participation, is useful. Some
contributors do expect that there is a direct payoff, but others see contributions as
their way of participating in the electoral process.
92. There always will be a debate as to whether contributions follow positions
or positions follow contributions. Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests Buy
Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J.L. & ECON.
345, 349 (2002) [hereinafter Stratmann, Financial Services]; see also, e.g., Gary C.
Durden & Jonathan J. Silberman, Determining Legislative Preferences for the
Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach, 84 J. POL. ECON. 317 (1976) (suggesting a
strong correlation between contributions and voting patterns). But cf. Henry W.
Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous
Probit-Tobit Model, REV. ECON. & STAT. 77 (1982) (taking the opposite position and
specifically refuting Durden and Silherman); Ansolabehere et al., supra note 87
(arguing that campaign contributions are not a wise investment; rather, they are a
form of political participation). Cf. Jeffrey Milyo et al., Corporate PAC Campaign
Contributions in Perspective, 2(1) Bus. AND POL. 75 (2000) (while acknowledging a
wide literature establishing the money-votes correlation and equating it with
bribery, the authors nonetheless challenge the true effectiveness of corporate
political contributions). The Supreme Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government Political Action Committee observed that while there are differing
perspectives, "there is little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will
work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question the
existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters." 528 U.S. 377, 395 (2000).
93. See Stratmann, Financial Services, supra note 92, at 13-17, 27.
94. The researchers examined a legislative area where candidates had not
necessarily previously articulated positions. The absence of a prior position
statement helps illustrate the problem better, because contributors will not have
given money based on a prior position. Therefore the researchers can better
determine whether the candidate takes a position that follows the money. Id. at 5-
6.
95. Id. at 13-17.
96. Id. at 27.
97. See Thomas Stratmann, Campaign Contributions and Congressional
Voting: Does the Timing of Contributions Matter?, REV. ECON & STAT. 127, 129
(1995) [hereinafter Stratmann, Timing].
98. Id. at 135 ('The results confirm the qualitative and quantitative importance
of campaign contributions.").
99. The distribution of contributions is no accident. Other research has shown
how there are economies at work where interested PACs seek the best way to
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not have been passed.10 0 Further in-depth research shows that on
issues ranging from NAFTA to defense spending to gun control,
major contributors seek and get targeted access 01 and move
votes. 10 2  These studies reinforce the proposition that money
concentrates power in the hands of the few, and not only helps
provide access, but also influences voting patterns and ultimate
legislative success. 10 3  As a result of well-placed campaign
contributions, the few have many members of Congress working
for them, while the many see their power diluted.
C. Status Quo: Buckley v. Valeo and Judicial Review of
Campaign Finance Reform
Campaign finance reform measures have been enacted at all
levels of government in response to this concentration of power
and in order to counterbalance the influence of money in politics.
Dozens of states and well over 100 localities have enacted major
distribute their resources to committee members who can be helpful to their causes.
The researchers effectively show the selection process for the most influential
committee members, as a means to ensure the most bang for the campaign buck.
"As each member of the House Banking committee develops his reputation through
time (hence reduces uncertainty), the sources of PAC contributions become more
concentrated .... Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Interest-Group
Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial
Services'Political Action Committees, 88 AMER. ECON. REV. 1163, 1183 (1998).
100. Stratmann, Timing, supra note 97, at 127 ("[W]ithout campaign
contributions farm interest would have lost in five of the seven votes that were
won."); see also Christopher Magee, Campaign Contributions, Policy Decisions, and
Election Outcomes, A Study of the Effects of Campaign Finance Reform, 64 JEROME
LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD C. PUB. POLY BRIEF 7, 37 (2001) (making a similar
finding that in terms of "House support for NAFTA, cuts in defense spending, and
gun control... PAC money appeared to be decisive on those issues").
101. Magee, supra note 100, at 37 ("Evidence consistent with that hypothesis is
that business groups gave more money to members of the Ways and Means and
Commerce Committees, labor groups targeted contributions to members of the
Education and Labor Committee, and defense PACs heavily supported members of
the National Security Committee."); see also BROOKS JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT 298
(1988). Jackson writes:
The pernicious effect of narrow factions can be seen clearly in the way
Congress set up housing-subsidy programs that aid wealthy developers
more than they help poor families. It showed itself in a tax code that
allowed 'investors' to profit from coal-mining ventures that mined no coal.
It was at work, as tax shelter syndicators grew rich through deals that
drained the Treasury without producing any tangible product.
Id.; see also Stratmann, Timing, supra note 97, at 132 (finding that farm interest
"campaign contributions are positively related to... membership in the House
Agriculture Committee").
102. See Magee, supra note 100, at 10-30.
103. A recent study shows that regulatory successes also can be obtained via
well-placed contributions. See Edwards, supra note 90, at 30 (arguing that
"campaign finance contributions ... influence policy outcomes").
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campaign finance reform measures. 104  In enacting these
measures, proponents have made clear their desire to counter the
concentration of power in the hands of the wealthy. 0 5 Such laws
are almost always subject to vigorous challenge,10 6 and while the
ensuing analysis typically strikes certain themes, it often misses
the larger constitutional point.
Since it was decided in 1976, Buckley v. Valeo10 7 has been the
beginning and end of the debate in virtually all analyses, 08
including the recent McConnell decision. 0 9 Ritualistic adherence
to Buckley treats campaigns first and foremost as speech exercises.
In Buckley, the Court held that campaign contributions and
104. See Local Campaign Finance Reform, National Civic League, Feb. 2002, at
http://www.ncl.org/npp/lcfr/inventory.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
105. For example, the Colorado legislature declared: "[L]arge campaign
contributions to political candidates allow wealthy contributors and special interest
groups to exercise a disproportionate level of influence over the political process."
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-45-102 (West 2002); see also 1997 Vt. Acts, No. 64, §1,
§1(a)(2) (finding that "[s]ome candidates and elected officials .. . respond... to
contributors who make large contributions in preference to those who make small
or no contributions."); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE §2.04.450(A) (1978); Seattle v.
State, 668 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Wash. 1983) (stating that Seattle's public financing law
is "clearly intended to express in general terms .;. that in the electoral process the
public interest expressed through the ballot box should prevail over special and
private interests"); Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1273
(D.N.M. 2001) (noting that City sought to ensure "ordinary citizens, not just the
very wealthy, can run for office in Albuquerque without having to receive large
sums of money from special interest groups"). See generally DANIEL ORTIZ, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AT WORK: CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REGULATION, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK (1997).
106. For a discussion of such challenges, see, e.g., Mark C. Alexander, Campaign
Finance Reform: Central Meaning and a New Approach, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
767, 821-23 (2003).
107. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
108. See, e.g., Kruse v. Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Any
judicial consideration of the constitutionality of campaign finance reform legislation
must begin and usually ends with the comprehensive decision in Buckley."); see also
Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d
1174, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2000); Right to Life of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d
766, 767 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
109. The majority opinion cited Buckley dozens of times, in nearly every
paragraph of its analysis. The Court also tellingly observed:
We are also mindful of the fact that in its lengthy deliberations leading to
the enactment of BCRA, Congress properly relied on the recognition of its
authority contained in Buckley and its progeny. Considerations of stare
decisis, buttressed by the respect that the Legislative and Judicial
Branches owe to one another, provide additional powerful reasons for
adhering to the analysis of contribution limits that the Court has
consistently followed since Buckley was decided.
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003). This is reminiscent of
a famous line in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 844 (1992): "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." Justice
O'Connor is the only co-author in both of these opinions.
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expenditures are core speech activities, deserving of First
Amendment protection. 110 Because political speech is core First
Amendment activity, strict scrutiny is required.11 ' The Court
famously held that even though political contributions could be
seen as speech, they are distinguished from expenditures.1' 2 The
Buckley Court held that the corrupting influence of money in
politics could provide a sufficiently powerful justification for
government regulation of contributions-as-speech," 3 but political
expenditures could not be capped." 4 Unfortunately, the Buckley
analysis treats campaigns as if they are pure debating exercises,
in an almost theoretical market of ideas, rather than in the
context of politics and the election of actual individuals to serve as
representatives in government. And as a result, this paradigm
ignores the questions presented and addressed in these pages. We
should understand the egalitarian values of the Voting Cases as
compelling governmental interests when engaging in Buckley's
balancing act.
II. Vote Dilution, Concentration of Power, and One-Person,
One-Vote
In the first half of the 1960s, the Supreme Court was often
asked to rule on questions involving voting and political power in
the United States." 5 The concentration of power today raises
questions similar to those confronted in the 1960s. In the Voting
Cases, aggrieved voters brought actions pursuant to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In resolving
these matters, the Court not only interpreted the Fourteenth
110. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 16-17, 19.
111. Id. at 16.
112. Id. at 21 ("A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the
support.").
113. Id. at 26-27 ('To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our
system of representative democracy is undermined."). The Court held that either
actual corruption or the appearance thereof would provide a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest to justify restrictions. Id. at 27.
114. Id. at 14, 16-17. The Court stated:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is
because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass
society requires the expenditure of money.
Id. at 19.
115. See, e.g., infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
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Amendment, it looked to several other constitutional sources: the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 116 the general history and
republican structure of government and its keystone, popular
sovereignty, and the structure of the Constitution and the promise
of Article I. The Court considered these various sources
holistically and rejected the concentration of power that had
resulted from malapportionment. 17  Specifically, the Court
announced a one-person, one-vote rule, but there was much more
than that. These Warren Court decisions fit within the greater
context of a progressive Court in a progressive social era-the
Second Reconstruction. 118 Through an integrated reading of the
116. While the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments also expand the
right to vote, the Voting Cases were decided in the first half of the 1960s, before
and contemporaneously with the adoption of those amendments. See infra note
156. The decisions consider only the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments. Id.
117. One leading scholar also takes a holistic approach, considering the
Fourteenth-Fifteenth Amendment connection:
If the future of the (F]ifteenth [A]mendment is to be anything more than
bleak, we must retreat. from the brittle formalisms which have dictated
that the political incorporation of racial minorities be treated as a question
of neutrality to be achieved in the impossibly stacked game of one-person-
one-vote competition suggested by the equality model of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment.
Emma C. Jordan, The Future of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 HOW. L.J. 541, 563
(1985).
118. In order to understand fully the vote dilution cases, we must also remember
their context. These Warren Court cases were decided in the first half of the 1960s,
in the midst of great societal change, during which time the Court had been
speaking about the importance of political, social, and societal equality in other
cases. While the Court sometimes discussed voting rights per se, it made clear the
fundamental role of equality of citizenship in America. Brown v. Board of
Education, for example, stressed the importance of education as "the very
foundation of good citizenship." 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Brown Court
observed that such fundamental training "must be made available to all on equal
terms." Id. The Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as encompassing
certain rights which reflect the overriding importance of constitutional equality in
cases like Loving v. Virginia, declaring Virginia's antimiscegenation statute
unconstitutional. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Further, the Court in Burton U.
Wilmington Parking Authority found that there was state action when a building in
which a private restaurant was located was financed by public funds, and
effectively sided with the sit-in protesters at lunch counters, providing an effective
tool for affecting desegregation. 365 U.S. 715, 723-24 (1961). Also, the Burton
decision pre-dates the Civil Rights Act of 1964, so the Court's ruling was
particularly helpful, strategically speaking, to the civil rights movement. Thus, we
find the vote dilution cases in the midst of a broader reconception of society and the
Court in the 1960s. The era produced a wave of groundbreaking cases outside the
Fourteenth Amendment context as well, notable in their broad declarations of the
individual rights of Americans and collective responsibilities of American society.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (providing specific
constitutional protections to criminal suspects subject to interrogation, under the
Fifth Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding
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text and the Amendments, the Justices found that the
Constitution endorsed a principle of equality of political
participation for all Americans. While not explicit in the text,
unquestionably there is a national commitment to this vision of
equality, located in the penumbras of the great document as
amended. 119 This section will review the Voting Cases, followed by
an in-depth discussion of the specific texts that supported the
Court's decisions. The constant refrain is that because of a
commitment to equality, the Constitution rejects the concentration
of power in the hands of the few.
A. The Voting Cases: The Court Rejects Concentrated
Electoral Power
The Court looked to many sources in resolving the Voting
Cases. Its conception of political equality and its specific response
to vote dilution grew out of various parts of the nation's history
and the Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments, and notions of representative government and
popular sovereignty. In this section, I will discuss how each was
interpreted to resolve the Voting Cases, and expand on the legal
implications of each in further detail.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection
First, these cases were brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, which provides its own
statement of equality: government shall not "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'120 While
other constitutional provisions addressed other voting questions, 121
privacy right in the "marital bedroom" to protect contraceptive use); N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (declaring, in the context of the First
Amendment, a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
119. See infra notes 120-202 and accompanying text.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each state .. "). The Fourteenth Amendment provided its
own political equalizer, as it eliminated the following three-fifths clause from
Article I, Section 3:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
121. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; U.S. CONST.
2005] 259
Law and Inequality
the Court found that the Equal Protection Clause encompassed an
overarching demand for equality of participation in the political
process. 122 In Gray v. Sanders, for example, the Court expounded:
[A]Il who participate in the election are to have an equal
vote-whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their
occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home
may be .... This is required by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concept of "we the people"
under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters
but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications.
The idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in his
State... underlies many of our decisions.1
23
Similarly and most succinctly, in Reynolds v. Sims the Court held:
"The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election of state legislators."'
124
Having derived a principle of equal participation from within the
Fourteenth Amendment, the question remained as to its
application to the facts of the case.
Applying the theory to the reality of malapportionment in
state governments, the Court spoke forcefully about the
Constitution's rejection of diluted or concentrated power.125 As
political power was expanded for some and contracted for others,
the Constitution was violated. The Court in Wesberry v. Sanders
clearly stated the issue as follows: "The apportionment statute
amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
122. Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz contend that "equal protection requires an
inquiry into whether all citizens enjoy sufficient equality in the political field to
participate meaningfully in public elections as voters, speakers, and candidates
whenever they so desire." Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional
Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1164 (1994) [hereinafter Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional
Imperative].
123. 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963). The Court continued: 'The idea that every
voter is equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor of
one of several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions." Id. at 380.
124. 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (emphasis added). The Reynolds Court also wrote:
And the concept of equal protection has been traditionally viewed as
requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation
to the governmental action questioned or challenged. With respect to the
allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of a State,
stand in the same relation regardless of where they live.
Id. at 565.
125. The Court stated:
We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection
Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an
individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living on other parts of the State.
Id. at 568.
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thus contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others.
If the Federal Constitution intends that when qualified voters
elect members of Congress each vote be given as much weight as
any other vote, then this statute cannot stand."126  The Voting
Cases thus established that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause demanded equality of representation and
equality of participation in the selection of representatives. 12
7
2. Interpreting the Voting Amendments
But the Court did not simply state that the Fourteenth
Amendment demanded equality and that therefore one-person,
one-vote would be the rule. The Court also drew upon the Voting
Amendments in reaching its conclusions supporting principles of
equality of political participation. 128 For example, in finding the
126. 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). The Reynolds Court wrote that "Wesberry clearly
established that the fundamental principle of representative government in this
country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard
to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State." Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 560-61.
127. In WMCA v. Lomenzo, the Court reviewed New York State's method of
election of state representative and district-drawing, and concluded:
The result of applying this complicated apportionment formula is to give
the populous counties markedly less senatorial representation, when
compared with respective population figures, than the less populous
counties .... Thus, a citizen in a less populous county had, under the
1953 apportionment, over 1.5 times the representation, on the average, of
a citizen in a populous county, and, under the apportionment based on the
1960 census, this ratio will be about 1.7-to-1.
377 U.S. 633, 644 (1964). The Court continued:
Further, under a proposed formula and the 1960 census figures, the
problem would have remained: under the current apportionment, applying
1960 census figures, the citizen population-variance ratio between the
most populous and least populous Assembly districts is about 21-to-1, and
a similar ratio in the Senate is about 3.9-to-1. If the Assembly were
reapportioned under the existing constitutional formulas, the most
populous Assembly district would have about 12.7 times as many citizens
as the least populous one, and a similar ratio in the Senate would be about
2.6-to-1.
Id. at 648. Echoing previous case law and offering very little further reasoning, the
Court held that "[h]owever complicated or sophisticated an apportionment scheme
might be, it cannot, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, result in a
significant undervaluation of the weight of the votes of certain of a State's citizens
merely because of where they happen to reside." Id. at 654. The case was decided
on the same day as Reynolds and Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly of
Colorado, thus providing hundreds of pages of reasoning in the varying opinions,
concurrences, and dissents.
128. The Court relied most heavily on the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments, and on the Seventeenth Amendment to a lesser extent. See Gray,
372 U.S. at 371, 381. The Twenty-fourth Amendment was, in effect,
contemporaneous with these decisions, having passed the Congress on August 27,
1962 and having been ratified by the State on January 23, 1964. The Twenty-sixth
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Georgia "county unit" system unconstitutional in Gray v.
Sanders,129 the Court specifically noted that the Fifteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments command voting equality and
superimposed the same value on its own analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment:
The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying or
abridging a Negro's right to vote. The Nineteenth Amendment
does the same for women. If a State in a statewide election
weighted the male vote more heavily than the female vote or
the white vote more heavily than the Negro vote, none could
successfully contend that that discrimination was allowable.
How then can one person be given twice or ten times the
voting power of another person in a statewide election merely
because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in the
smallest rural county?130
The Court responded with a broad, sweeping statement, arguably
one of political philosophy, drawing heavily on historical texts and
the Voting Amendments. The Court held, "[t]he conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person,
one vote."13
1
Nowhere in the text of those Amendments do we find the
phrases "political equality" or "one person, one vote." 132 Neither do
the Declaration of Independence or the Gettysburg Address
contain those terms. 133 The Court was declaring that there was an
implicit message in these texts, in these amendments, and above
all, in the political and constitutional history of the United States
of America. 134 That history and tradition embodied the principle of
Amendment was passed and ratified in 1971, after these decisions. See THE
CONSTITUTION OF AMERICA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 41 n.16, 43 n.18
(George A. Costello et al. eds., 1996).
129. Gray, 372 U.S. at 371, 381; see supra Part I.A. 1.
130. Gray, 372 U.S. at 379.
131. Id. at 381.
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; U.S. CONST. amend.
XIX.
133. Among the phrases in the Gettysburg address that may have been most
relevant are first, the reaffirmation of "the proposition that all men are created
equal" and the conclusion "that government of the people, by the people, for the
people, shall not perish from this earth." Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address
(Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in 12 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAw 470 (2d
ed. 2005). The Declaration of Independence famously states: "We hold these
Truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
134. The Reynolds Court also favorably cited Gray's interpretation of the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 558 (1964).
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political equality, which translated into a rule of one-person, one-
vote. 135  Thus, the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting
Amendments embraced political equality and rejected the dilution
of political power.
3. The Nature of the Republic and Popular Sovereignty
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting
Amendments, the Court discussed the fundamental nature of
American government itself. Again, it found a commitment to
equality of political participation. For example, the complaint in
Wesberry alleged that voters were deprived of the full benefit of
their right to vote, in violation of Article I, Section 2, of the
Constitution. 3 6 Accordingly, the Court carefully considered the
nature of representative government, specifically as reflected in
the choice of a republic and in the manner of selection of members
of the Legislative Branch. The Court considered how to apply
principles of representative government, as reflected in the
Constitution, to the problem of concentrated and diluted power
that resulted from malapportionment:
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command
of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen "by the People of
the several States" means that as nearly as is practicable one
man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much
as another's .... To say that a vote is worth more in one
district than in another would not only run counter to our
fundamental ideas of/democratic government, it would cast
aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected "by
the People," a priniciple tenaciously fought for and established
at the Constitutional Convention. 137
Because of this analysis of American democracy, and its focus on
"complete equality,"'138 the Court struck down Georgia's plan.139
In Reynolds v. Sims, 140 the Court also drew upon the theory
of representative government, specifically as reflected in Article I,
for guidance. Chief Justice Warren started with a declaration of
135. The Reynolds Court linked the Voting Amendments as a sign of general
expansion of rights to civil rights legislation passed in 1957 and 1960. Id. at 555
("And history has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage
in this country.").
136. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 3 (1964); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2
("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States ...."); supra Part I.A.2.
137. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8. Arguably, after adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, the same statement can be made about the Senate.
138. Id. at 14.
139. Id. at 8-9; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part I.A.3; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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political-governmental theory: "The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence in a democratic society,
and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of
representative government." 141 The Court connected popular
sovereignty and representative government, again stressing the
centrality of equality of participation in the political process. 142
Voting, the specific question before the Court, was emblematic of
this equality, but the Court's words speak to an even broader
importance of equality of political participation:
[R]epresentative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the people,
and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and
effective participation in the political processes of his State's
legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation
only as qualified voters through the election of legislators to
represent them. Full and effective participation by all citizens
in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have
an equally effective voice in the election of members of his
state legislature. Modern and viable state government needs,
and the Constitution demands, no less. 143
On the specific facts, therefore, the Court articulated the one-
person, one-vote rule. 44  But by employing phrases like
"inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political
processes"'145 and "equally effective voice,"'146 the opinion declared
an even broader notion of equality, growing from the political-
theoretical roots of American representative government. Thus
the Court stressed themes of political equality in its Voting Case
opinions. 147
Taken as a whole, these cases represent a political
141. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); see also id. ("And the right of
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote
just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.").
142. Id. at 561-62.
143. Id. at 565.
144. The Reynolds court heavily emphasized the path that had been worn in the
previous terms, but it was required to take another step, to announce the
controlling standards for implementation. Id. at 559 ("Of course, in these cases we
are faced with the problem not presented in Gray-that of determining the basic
standards and stating the applicable guidelines for implementing our decision in
Baker v. Carr."); see also id. at 557-58, 568-69 (emphasizing the importance of
political equality and past judicial support in Gray and Baker).
145. Id. at 565.
146. Id.
147. Along these lines, recall that the Gray Court wrote "[t]he concept of 'we the
people' under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality
among those who meet the basic qualifications." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
379-80 (1963).
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reconstruction, as the Court announced a philosophy of equality of
participation in political processes. 148  The Court rejected the
concentration of power in the hands of the few and the
concomitant dilution of the power of the many. On the facts, it
announced specific holdings and rules collectively known as the
one-person, one-vote rule,149 but indeed the Court was undertaking
so much more.1 50 The Court was asked to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment in the context of malapportionment and vote dilution,
and it consistently responded with one theme: equality.
151
However, it was not just equality derived from the language of the
148. This generated criticism, both on the Court and off. See generally Philip B.
Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1964); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959); cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decision, 69
YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Louis Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A
Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959). But the Justices did not
just pull this idea out of thin air. While some objected to broad philosophical
statements outside the exact letter of the law or Constitution, the Court properly
identified the thread that ran throughout so many of the core declarations about
the right to vote. That was a principle of equality, and in the 1960s cases, the
Court explicitly turned to the Equal Protection Clause and its mandate of equality,
while also paying homage to a long history of equality in the voting context.
Dissenting voices complained most strenuously about a lack of roots, charging that
the majority improperly was making a broad political statement, not rendering
justice based on a strict reading of the Constitution and its Amendments. Most
typically, Justice Stewart's Lucas dissent to "[t]he Court's draconian
pronouncement" lamented, "what the Court has done is to convert a particular
political philosophy into a constitutional rule." Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 746, 748 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Indeed,
as the series of apportionment cases rolled forward, they reflected the Warren
Court's broad assault on prior judicial approaches. As discussed earlier, during
this era the Court aggressively attacked social problems and painted with a
broader political and philosophical brush than many had been used to. See supra
note 118 and accompanying text. And along with that came charges that the Court
was overstepping its bounds, for example in landmark cases like Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). There, the Court pointedly looked forward, noting
that "[i]n approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when
the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson
was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation." Id. at 492-93. And
the Court spoke of law, politics, and philosophy: "We conclude that in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id. at 495.
149. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 852-57 (2d ed. 2002).
150. One author effectively "argues that a direct role for courts in reviewing and,
indeed, in defining the nature of the protection afforded under the [F]ifteenth
[A]mendment is supportable." Jordan, supra note 117, at 545.
151. See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1392 (1994) ('The 'one person-one vote' rule exemplifies the
commitment to political equality.").
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Equal Protection Clause. The Court read a mandate of equality of
participation in the political process from within the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, 152 and Nineteenth Amendments. It also made clear
that the structure of American government was centered upon a
promise of popular sovereignty and representative democracy that
demanded equality. The next two sections will further elucidate
the Court's reasoning.
B. Voting and Political Equality in the Amendments
Even though the Congress, as created, reflected popular
sovereignty, there still were many features of American
government that could be called elitist. The anti-egalitarian
nature of the Constitution was clear, in large part because the
document itself excluded so many from participation in the
political process. Originally, the power of political participation-
the power to rule-was placed in the hands of the few: white,
male, propertied citizens held the power. 153 But through the
152. The Seventeenth Amendment did not expand the protection of the vote in
such a grand fashion as did the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, but it
made a very important statement about the vote that had an impact on even more
people than those other two sweeping changes. "The Senate of the United States
shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people
thereof ... " U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added). It was passed by
Congress on May 13, 1912 and ratified on April 8, 1913. The Amendment modified
Article I, Section 3, which read: 'The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six
Years; and each Senator shall have one vote." U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 3 (emphasis
added). By providing for the direct election of Senators, the Seventeenth
Amendment provided every American voter with an additional opportunity to
exercise the franchise. (Seven years passed before women enjoyed this benefit upon
the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.) And in doing so, it brought
the upper chamber closer to the people and made its members directly responsive
to the people. The Seventeenth Amendment thus spoke volumes about equality by
changing the structure of the Constitution and the Senate to allow the people's vote
to determine the composition of not only the House, but the Senate as well.
153. The definition of the individual participant in the political process has
expanded, so that far more people can vote today than when the Constitution was
ratified. The founding-era idea of a white, male, freeholder as voter does not
comport with the modern day notion. One commentator has observed:
If one were to equate "the People" in the newly-created American republic
with those persons who actually voted for their representatives in state
legislatures and Congress, the source of sovereign power in the new nation
was not widely dispersed. Women did not vote. Most blacks did not vote.
In most states eligibility for suffrage was conditioned on the possession of
freehold land ... or the possession of other property valued over a certain
amount. Although these suffrage conditions broke down over time, for a
good portion of the nineteenth century they had the effect of limiting the
suffrage to freehold-owning white males.
G. Edward White, Reading the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 787, 796
(1994). As we will see, the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting denial of the vote
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Amendment process, that power and right has been changed,
perhaps more than any other, and the importance of the vote has
grown and become more clearly enmeshed in the fabric of the great
document. This expansion reflects not only the importance of the
vote itself' 54 but also a principle of equality. Taken as a whole, the
Voting Amendments reflect the nation's desire to bring more
people, as participants, into the political-governmental process. 155
In examining this doctrinal development in greater depth, we will
see that it reflects principles of equality and popular sovereignty,
as well as a growing conception of broader political participation
for the many, as opposed to concentrating power in the hands of
the few. We now consider the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments.156
based on race or previous condition of servitude, erased one of the exclusive aspects
of the original constitutional scheme. See U.S. CONST, amend. XV. The Nineteenth
Amendment brought in the excluded half of the country by extending the vote to
women. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. The Twenty-fourth Amendment stripped
the class-based aspects of the former exclusivity, by prohibiting poll taxes. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XXIV. This principle was extended to the states in a series of
Supreme Court decisions. See Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S 204 (1970); Kramer
v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The Twenty-
sixth Amendment effectively brought down the voting age, to include eighteen year-
olds in the political process. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. These fundamental
alterations to the nation's governing document reflect the consensus, now
enshrined in the Constitution, that almost all Americans should be extended the
right to vote.
154. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious
in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the
laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.").
155. Other scholars have also seen these amendments as related. See, e.g.,
Edward Hartnett, A "Uniform and Entire" Constitution; Or, What if Madison Had
Won? 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 276 (1998) ("The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-
fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments each expand the franchise by eliminating a
traditional basis for denying people the ability to participate in political life: race,
sex, poverty, and youth. They belong together, and a Madisonian approach to the
process of constitutional amendment would put them together.").
156. While this Article focuses on the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments,
the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments also extended equality
principles and shed further light on our discussion. While the Fifteenth
Amendment had so broadly expanded the right to vote for African Americans, the
vote did not flow freely to its prime intended beneficiaries. See, e.g., Jordan, supra
note 117, at 563 (noting, in the Fifteenth Amendment context, the "unavoidably
political setting for insuring effective political participation by racial minorities
who have been discouraged, by violence, oppression, and economic duress, from
entering the political life of the country," and a "history of prior racial violence and
torture" to stop full enforcement of the Amendment). The poll tax stood as one
clear obstacle to preventing achievement of full political equality, most notably
employed in the South as a way to keep low income African Americans from voting.
See Ronnie L. Podolefsky, The Illusion of Suffrage: Female Voting Rights and the
Women's Poll Tax Repeal Movement After the Nineteenth Amendment, 7 COLUM. J.
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1. The Fifteenth Amendment
The Fifteenth Amendment embraces the importance of
equality of participation in American society, as represented in the
vote. Most simply, the Fifteenth Amendment can be seen as a
federal constitutional guarantee of the right to vote to newly freed
slaves who had been denied the franchise when the Constitution
was ratified in 1789.157 After the Civil War and the Emancipation
Proclamation, slavery was abolished. 158 But that is too simple and
incomplete-it took constitutional amendment to complete the
sweeping change in the nation's fundamental structure, as
detailed in its governing document.1 59 Thus, the Thirteenth
Amendment abolished slavery.160 The Fourteenth Amendment
declared equality of rights for all Americans.' 6' And the Fifteenth
GENDER & L. 185, 191 (1998). In the midst of a broad national movement for civil
rights in the 1960s, Congress passed the Twenty-fourth Amendment abolishing poll
taxes in national elections in the summer of 1962, and it was ratified in 1964. The
abolition of the poll tax advanced the political equality sought by the removal of
income or wealth class from the ballot box. While the Twenty-fourth Amendment
applied to federal elections, a series of cases applied the Equal Protection Clause to
extend the prohibition to state elections. See cases noted supra note 153. In 1971,
the Twenty-sixth Amendment effectively lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. The amendment passed the Congress on March 23,
1971 and was ratified by the States on July 1, 1971. No other amendment has
moved as quickly from congressional passage to ratification. The main argument
for this amendment was that if an eighteen year-old could be drafted, fight, and
possibly die for his country, he ought to be able to vote for those who run it.
RICHARD C. REMY, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: DEMOCRACY IN ACTION 273
(104th Cong. ed., 1996); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164 n.152 (1991) [hereinafter Amar, Bill of
Rights] ("Even more recently, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment extending the
franchise to eighteen-year-olds grew out of the perceived unfairness of any gap
between the Vietnam draft age and the voting age.").
157. At that time, 10 percent of the population of the United States was African
American, most of whom were enslaved and had little to no political voice. REMY,
supra note 156, at 271.
158. The Emancipation Proclamation, issued in preliminary form on September
22, 1862, went into effect on January 1, 1863. Emancipation Proclamation (issued
Sept. 22, 1862), reprinted in 12 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 307 (2d
ed. 2005).
159. See generally Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of American
Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2153 (1996) ("One of the most
important outcomes of the Civil War was the establishment of a new constitutional
order.").
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing, in part, that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws").
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Amendment prohibited the deprivation of the right to vote "on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."'162 As a
sweeping statement of political equality, the Fifteenth
Amendment could be said to be the most important of the Civil
War Amendments. 163 It marked the end of one long period of
struggle 164 for social equality which was rewarded and verified by
the constitutional grant of a key political equality.
First, the amendment speaks symbolically to the past to
refute the original position of the African-American vote and
ratifies the results of the Civil War. The Great Compromise, in
establishing the Constitution and the nation, resulted, even in the
face of unity, in a north-south divide over the issue of slavery and
states' rights. 165 The division never truly disappeared,' 66 and after
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
163. See Wang, supra note 159, at 2153 ("Of the three amendments, the
Fifteenth Amendment was the most revolutionary product of Reconstruction
politics. By conferring on black Americans the right to vote, an essential right
enabling a citizen to be politically accountable in a democracy, the amendment
redefined the meaning of American freedom and democracy.").
164. The struggle predates the formation of the United States of America, and
was in some ways memorialized in the Constitution.
165. See generally U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3. See also PAUL BOYER, TODD &
CURTI'S THE AMERICAN NATION 147 (1995) ("This Great Compromise granted each
state, regardless of size, an equal voice in the upper house. In the lower house,
representation would be according to population."); Bruce A. Ackerman, Taxation
and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-13 (1999) (providing an interesting
discussion of 'The Tainted Origins of the 'Direct Tax' Clauses," connecting it to the
Great Compromise); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal
Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 68-69 (1991)
("[Rlace and slavery, although never explicitly mentioned [in the original
Constitution], cemented the Great Compromise between the Southern slave-
holding states and the Northern states together like a bloody glue."); James E.
Viator, Give Me that Old-Time Historiography: Charles Beard and the Study of the
Constitution Part II, 43 LOY. L. REV. 311, 336 n.125 (1997) (discussing legal history
and the contributions of Charles Beard and in particular, providing an interesting
note on scholarly interpretation and debate over the Great Compromise).
166. For example, the debates over the admission of new states constantly
included questions of which states were to be free states and which were to be slave
states. The Missouri Compromise, in 1819, was intended to resolve this conflict.
By virtue of the Compromise, Congress admitted Missouri as a slave state but
prohibited slavery north of the 36,30' latitude. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 23, § 8, 3
Stat. 545, 548. But Dred Scott v. Sanford held that slaves were considered "as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated to the dominant
race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and
had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the
Government might choose to grant them." 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856).
The Court further declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional. Id. While
the Court might have thought it was making a final declaration on the matter, this
decision became the focal point in the debate over slavery, and in turn a
precipitating factor in the Civil War. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 149,
at 666-67.
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75 years, the nation was at war with itself. With President
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, the Gettysburg Address,
and ultimately, the Union triumph on the battlefields, the
abolitionist position prevailed. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments affirmed the change, effectively refuting
the original constitutional position on slavery and African-
American (in)equality.167
Second, the Fifteenth Amendment may also be seen in
instrumental terms, as a tool to help AfricanAmericans achieve
even greater long-term success politically. "Black suffrage was the
most important issue at the National Convention of Colored Men
held in Syracuse, New York in October 1864. [Frederick] Douglass
and other black leaders welcomed the proposed Thirteenth
Amendment, but they warned that without the right to vote,
blacks could not permanently maintain their freedom." 168  And
indeed, as the States granted blacks the right to vote, 169 these new
voters used it to their political advantage, for example, in winning
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 170 Instrumentally, the
Fifteenth Amendment advanced political equality. 171
In a different instrumental sense, the Fifteenth Amendment
was a political tool for Radical Republicans who wanted to cement
their power. 172 "For them, the most effective means by which to
167. "The idea of equality as pronounced by the Declaration of Independence was
the main ideological source for Reconstruction politics, and the Civil War and
Emancipation had generated enormous dynamics for materializing that idea."
Wang, supra note 159, at 2222.
168. Id. at 2171.
169. The First Reconstruction Act statutorily mandated the right to vote for
African Americans. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 6, 14 Stat. 428, 429. But a
statutory grant-by whatever authority-of the vote to African Americans was
limited; without a constitutional guarantee, the vote could easily be taken away.
170. See Wang, supra note 159, at 2213 ("Blacks constituted a majority in
Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Florida. It was the solid
black votes that secured the Southern ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and other congressional conditions.").
171. Emma Coleman Jordan provides a useful perspective on the way in which
the Fifteenth Amendment speaks instrumentally to power. See Jordan, supra note
117, at 562. Jordan writes:
True equality of political participation can best be achieved by preserving
meaningful access for racial and ethnic minorities. In fact, one group of
political scientists have [sic] recognized that the political incorporation of
minorities will be achieved if: excluded groups move toward political
equality: [by achieving three goals] 1. 'They must get elected.' 2. 'They
must become part of a coalition.' 3. 'The coalition must be dominant.'
Id.
172. Founded in the early 1850s, the Republican Party became a national party
only in 1856; thus, establishing a power base was no small task. See The
Republican Party-GOP History, The Republican National Committee, at
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safeguard the results of the war was to turn the military power
that black soldiers possessed during the war into a political muscle
in the postwar period."173  Newly-freed slaves were seen as a
treasure trove of such votes. "It became clear that black votes
were crucial to Grant's [1868] election. He won a plurality of only
about 300,000 in the election at which an estimated 500,000 blacks
cast their votes for the Republicans."' 174 African-American suffrage
was used as a tool to benefit Republicans, but it was more than
shrewd Republican politics, it was also African-American political
empowerment. In addition, by adding hundreds of thousands of
voters immediately, and millions more in the years to come, the
Fifteenth Amendment provided federal protection of the right to
vote and diluted the concentrated power that had rested in
virtually all white hands, redistributing it so as to include African
Americans.
Finally and most importantly, the Fifteenth Amendment
speaks to the need to ensure equality of participation in political
life in the United States. 175 For example, as Congress debated
voting rights as part of full emancipation and freedom, one
member argued: "We have attempted to set up and maintain a
government upon the doctrine of the equality of man, the universal
right of all to participate in the Government. In accordance with
that theory we must accept the ballot upon the principle of
equality."176  Historian Wang Xi has thoroughly examined the
amendment's roots and concluded: "This Amendment
http://www.rnc.org/gopinfo/history/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
173. Wang, supra note 159, at 2175. The military service-citizenship-voting link
is found elsewhere. Akhil Reed Amar has insightfully demonstrated a consistent
pattern linking military service (and other indicia of full participation in American
life) and voting rights, which coincides with this Article's attempt to view common
themes in the Voting Amendments. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court
1999 Term, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 128
(2000) [hereinafter Amar, Supreme Court 19991. Amar writes:
Later Amendments tighten the linkage between military service and
voting as paired political rights. Thus, Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment defines a state's presumptive electorate in a fashion roughly
akin to its militia base of adult males; the Fifteenth Amendment confers
suffrage on black men in part as a reward for their military service in the
Civil War; and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment gives those old enough to
fight the right to vote, too.
Id.
174. Wang, supra note 159, at 2215.
175. Id. at 2222 ("The idea of equality as pronounced by the Declaration of
Independence was the main ideological source for Reconstruction politics, and the
Civil War and Emancipation had generated enormous dynamics for materializing
that idea.").
176. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1866).
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constitutionally recognized the principle of political equality
between black and white male Americans.... More importantly,
the Amendment added new substance to the meaning of American
freedom."'177 The additional substance is equality, encompassing
more than just the actual vote itself. Legal scholars offer similar
perspectives. Akhil Reed Amar persuasively argues that "the
promise of the Fifteenth Amendment [is] that Americans of
different races must come together-at the polls, in the legislature,
on the jury-as democratic equals in self-government."'178  The
Fifteenth Amendment incorporates values that lie at the core of
representative democracy, and this is where the Constitution
begins to speak explicitly about those values. Emma Coleman
Jordan posits that "the [F]ifteenth [A]mendment is the primary
repository of the constitutional value of preserving the political
access and participation of blacks and other racial minorities."'179
Thus understood, the Fifteenth Amendment was designed not only
to help newly-freed slaves participate equally in the American
political-governmental sphere, but also to declare broader
principles of political equality.
In these various ways the Fifteenth Amendment speaks to
political equality and reflects and reinforces the Court's
pronouncements in the Voting Cases.180
177. Wang, supra note 159, at 2221-22.
178. Amar, Supreme Court 1999, supra note 173, at 63. Elsewhere, he has
argued
that the best interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment would read it as
encompassing a cluster of political rights; the Amendment protects not
only the right to vote, but also the right to hold office, the right to be voted
for, the right to vote in a legislature, the right to serve on a jury, and even
the right to serve in the military.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifteenth Amendment and "Political Rights," 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2225, 2225 (1996).
179. Jordan, supra note 117, at 561-62.
180. Even with these lofty goals, the Fifteenth Amendment only marked a new
chapter, and certainly not the end in the struggle for political equality, as blacks
were consistently denied the vote for another century, until the Voting Rights Act
interceded to protect the right with the imprimatur of the federal government. See
Wang, supra note 159, at 2223 ("The compromises continued after black suffrage
was memorialized in the Constitution. Thus, while black American males were
proclaimed equal voters, the battle to maintain and effectuate their voting rights
had just begun."). We must be realistic in ascribing absolute power to the Fifteenth
Amendment as an insurer and supporter of political equality. Emma Coleman
Jordan writes:
[V]iewed from the historical vantage point of the [Flifteenth [A]mendment,
minority electoral participation is different. The difference is in the
unavoidably political setting for insuring effective political participation by
racial minorities who have been discouraged, by violence, oppression, and
economic duress, from entering the political life of the country with any
real expectation of success. Therefore, we cannot ignore the history of
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2. The Nineteenth Amendment
After the Fifteenth Amendment, political power remained
largely concentrated in the hands of men. A long time coming, the
Nineteenth Amendment addressed this problem. 8 1 I suggest
several ways to understand the Nineteenth Amendment,
contributing ultimately to the broad call for political equality
embodied in the Voting Amendments. 182
In its most straightforward sense, the Nineteenth
Amendment, by prohibiting the denial of the vote on the basis of
sex, can be seen as a limited declaration of equality between the
sexes.'8 3 Women, who were citizens in other respects, 8 4 were not
deemed as equals. The Nineteenth Amendment as an attack on
inequality 8 5 was geared toward achieving a particularly important
prior racial violence and torture, which, although perhaps not in the
nature of original sin, is surely entitled to be taken into account in
adjusting the rights and opportunities of racial and ethnic minority
citizens.
Jordan, supra note 117, at 563. While this statement speaks of disappointment, it
also reflects the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment marked a beginning.
181. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex.").
182. Not only do I suggest multiple meanings at this point in time, but also that
the vote had no single meaning to the suffragists. As Aileen Kraditor states: "The
woman suffrage movement had no official ideology. Its members and leaders held
every conceivable view of current events and represented every philosophical
position." Aileen Kraditor, quoted in Sarah B. Lawsky, A Nineteenth Amendment
Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 109 YALE L.J. 783, 787-88 (2000).
183. The Equal Rights Amendment was passed by the Congress and ratified by
35 states, but not the requisite 38, so it was not adopted. It provided: "Equality of
Rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any
state on account of sex." Equal Rights Amendment: Hearing on S. J. Res. 61 Before
a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. 1 (1945). The Canadian
Constitution notably has a fuller declaration of equal rights for men and women:
"Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in
it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons." CAN. CONST. (Constitution
Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 28.
184. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 162 (1874) ("In that sense, women,
born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction of the United States, have always
been considered citizens of the United States, as much so before the adoption of the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the Constitution as since."). Id.
185. Reva Siegel writes, "suffragists also attacked status inequality directly."
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 990 (2002). She continues:
[Flollowing the traditions of the antislavery movement, [suffragists] often
used the language of the American Constitution to do so. Male suffrage,
Susan B. Anthony bluntly explained to the House Judiciary Committee in
1880, "establishes between the sexes that hateful thing of inequality; ... it
makes all men sovereigns and all women subjects; ... it makes all men,
politically, superiors and all women inferiors" and inflicts "not only
political degradation, but. .. also social, moral, and industrial
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measure of equality, "not only as a means to improve women's
lives, but also because it would symbolize recognition of women's
'equal personal rights and equal political privileges with all other
citizens."'1 86 It reflected the changing conception of who was to be
a full member of society, with rights of participation in the
political process. As one member of Congress urged:
In the past the restriction of the right of suffrage to the male
population was not contrary to democratic philosophy, because
under the old order of civilization women derived their social
status from their men and were economically dependent upon
them.
For the past half century a change in this regard has been
taking place in the social structure, particularly in the last
generation .... This status by women having been achieved,
participation in political affairs is a necessary corollary. 187
This evolving conception of equality operated to increase
participation in politics and government.
The Nineteenth Amendment can also be seen as a means to
spread political power more evenly. As the Fifteenth Amendment
had challenged-and changed-the concentration of political
power in white hands, the Nineteenth Amendment attacked the
concentration of power in the hands of men. Women had been
denied the vote, in large part based on arguments that their
husbands served their interests at the ballot box.18s  Thus
degradation" on women.
Id.
186. Jennifer K. Brown, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality, 102
YALE L.J. 2175, 2178 (1993). Brown continues: "As the first right of a citizen,
suffrage meant citizenship; it was the very substance of self-government." Id.
Another author writes, "[t]o justify women's suffrage both women and men asserted
the equality of the sexes." Jacob Katz Cogan, The Look Within: Property, Capacity,
and Suffrage in Nineteenth Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 487 (1997) (citing
examples from the Massachusetts and Ohio constitutional conventions in the
1850s).
187. 56 CONG. REc. 788 (1918) (statement of Rep. Lehlbach); see also Siegel,
supra note 185, at 1007 ("[D]ramatic changes in the ways Americans understood
women's position in the family in turn produced changes in the common sense
application of democratic principles to the question of their voting.").
188. Fathers and brothers and even sons also performed this function. This
argument was pressed for many decades. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
3035 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson) ("[The ballot] is not given to the woman,
because it is not needed for her security. Her interests are best protected by father,
husband, and brother."); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2962 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Poland) ('The theory is that the fathers, husbands, brothers, and
sons to whom the right of suffrage is given will in its exercise be as watchful of the
rights and interests of their wives, sisters, and children who do not vote as of their
own."); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2243 (1864) (statement of Sen. Howe)
("I am willing to deprive those who are not males of the right of suffrage, because
they exercise it by proxy, as we all know. Females send their votes to the ballot-box
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understood, denial of the franchise was more complex than was
readily apparent, by directly taking the power of the vote-the
power of political participation-from one set of hands and vesting
it in others.18 9  But such concentration was challenged' 9 0-and
changed-by adding the formerly excluded half of the population
to the voter rolls.
The attack on the concentration of power in male hands also
ties in with the preservation of the central principles of self-
government and popular sovereignty. 191  Men "representing"
women in this fashion violated sacrosanct principles of popular
sovereignty, as power was concentrated in the hands of less than
half of the nation's citizens, so self-governance was a mere
shibboleth.192 The Nineteenth Amendment embraced the notion
that political power should be entrusted to the hands of the many,
not concentrated in the hands of the few.' 93 Thus, not only was
by their husbands or other male friends."). But see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d
Sess. 57 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan) ("I know it has been said that the woman
is represented by her husband, represented by the male; and yet we know how she
has been represented by her husband in by-gone times; we know how she is
represented by her barbarian husband"); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 55
(1866) (statement of Sen. Anthony) ("Nor is it a fair statement of the case to say
that the man represents the woman in the exercise of suffrage, because it is an
assumption on the part of the man; it is an involuntary representation so far as the
woman is concerned."). Plus, during the debate on the Nineteenth Amendment,
one member of Congress argued: "The suggestion has been made here to-day that
woman has only to rely upon the stalwart oak that stands beside her and have faith
in the chivalry of men. The record of this country and the record of the world does
not sustain that doctrine." 52 CONG. REC. 1437 (1915) (statement of Rep. Bryan).
See generally Lawsky, supra note 182, at 791; Siegel, supra note 185, at 986.
189. Women were deemed to have a role of daughter, wife, and mother, all
within the confines of domestic life, but not outside. Jacob Cogan suggests that
anti-suffragists in the nineteenth century "assert[ed] that women and men had
different capacities: one public and political, the other private and familial."
Cogan, supra note 186, at 489.
190. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 710 (1869) (statement of Sen.
Pomeroy) ("Do not tell me that the rights of one class of citizens are safe in the
hands of another, that the men will take care of the rights of the women.").
191. See Siegel, supra note 185, at 990 ("In using the language of 'self-
sovereignty' and 'self-government,' the woman's rights movement quite consciously
employed American traditions of individualism to challenge relations of gender
status.").
192. This phrase is borrowed from Justice Thurgood Marshall, who used it in the
First Amendment context: "When there are no effective means of communication,
free speech is a mere shibboleth. I believe that the First Amendment requires it to
be a reality." Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 586 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
193. See 52 CONG. REC. 1418 (1915) (statement of Rep. Lafferty) ("The ultrarich,
feeling that the power of the ballot is a menace to them in the hands of only half
the population, very naturally oppose its extension to the other half."); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3035 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson) ("It is only
where political power is in the hands of a favored few that oppression can be
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concentration of power a problem, it undercut principles of
American representative government. 194 In effect, to the extent
that men cast "their" women's votes, men became their unelected
representatives. But such an arrangement and status
contradicted the constitutional organizing principle of popular
sovereignty. 195
Recent scholarly attention offers a nuanced and
comprehensive understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment,
placing the push for woman's suffrage in the context of the post-
Civil War Amendments and the push for equality for African
Americans, and seeing it as a call for broad equality. 196 For
example, Reva Siegel persuasively delineates the history of the
Nineteenth Amendment,197 from the drafting and adoption of the
practiced. It is only where oppression exists that the agents of a superior power are
needed for protection.").
194. Siegel, supra note 185, at 990-91 ("[Following the traditions of the
antislavery movement, [suffragists] often used the language of the American
Constitution, ... '[A]s Elizabeth Cady Stanton put it .... You have granted titles
of nobility to every male voter, making all men rulers, governors, sovereigns, over
all women."'); see also Lawsky, supra note 182, at 791 ("Suffragists also emphasized
the republican notions of the importance of the common good and of the virtue of
political participants.").
195. Siegel forcefully asserts the argument: "Whether suffragists argued their
case in the language of individualism or in the language of status hierarchy, one
message was clear: men could not and did not represent women." Siegel, supra
note 185, at 991.
196. Going back to 1848, while the country debated over the freedom of enslaved
African Americans, women began to gather at places like Seneca Falls to discuss
their rights and freedom. See REMY, supra note 156, at 271 ("On July 19, 1848,
women assembled at the Seneca Falls Convention, in New York, to begin the fight
for equal rights."); The Seneca Falls Convention, Library of Congress, American
Treasures of the Library of Congress, available at
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trr040.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
197. See Siegel, supra note 185, at 974 n.76. She writes:
The woman suffrage amendment was first introduced in this form in 1869.
There seems to have been no alternative language proposed until 1880
.... The Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage incorporated this
proposal into S. 19, the version of the amendment it proposed for adoption
in 1884. In the House, however, Representative White proposed an
amendment providing that "the right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of sex." The Senate began to consider this version of the
amendment-the version that ultimately became the Nineteenth
Amendment-in February 1885.
Id. (citations omitted). Further, many members of Congress debated woman
suffrage during debates on extending the vote to blacks. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-66 (1866). But, as one proponent argued, change was not to
come at that time, it would come in the future. Senator Anthony predicted that
woman suffrage "is coming with the progress of civilization and the general
amelioration of the race, and the triumph of truth and justice and equal rights."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1866).
2005] MONEY IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 277
Fourteenth Amendment until the adoption of the Nineteenth,
framing it in a larger sociohistoric context that stresses the
importance of equality to its proponents. 198 Further, Akhil Reed
Amar argues for a holistic reading of the Constitution and its
amendments and urges that the Nineteenth Amendment means
that women were entitled to full political and other citizenship
rights, not only the right to vote. 199 This broader theoretical
construct speaks to fundamental notions of equality that lie at the
heart of these amendments.200
Taken together, these various points culminate in a moment
just as significant as the Fifteenth Amendment. The Nineteenth
Amendment meant more than that the vote would be protected for
women by constitutional decree. It righted wrongs of the past,
eradicated the concentration of political power that had rested in
the hands of the few, affirmed the equality of women,20 1 and
reinforced the Constitution's promise of representative
democracy. 20 2
198. Siegel, supra note 185, at 968-1006.
199. Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 156, at 1202-03. Amar persuasively argues
that the amendment "affirms a very different and more robust vision of women as
full and equal members of the political People who govern America." Amar,
Supreme Court 1999, supra note 173, at 52.
200. There has been a recent spate of such attention, including the articles by
Siegel and Amar, supra notes 185 and 199 respectively, and several well-
researched and thought-provoking student notes. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 186;
Cogan, supra note 186; Lawsky, supra note 182, at 790.
201. See also Lawsky, supra note 182, at 790. She writes:
More narrowly, suffragists believed the vote would allow women to
participate, as full citizens, in community life. Women were of course
citizens before the Nineteenth Amendment, but, as the Supreme Court had
announced in 1874, women were not full, political citizens. That is, while
women were "citizen[s] from ... birth, and entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizenship," their citizenship did not include the right to
vote. Suffragists were determined to move beyond this second-class
citizenship, referring to the ballot as providing "political recognition" and
"political equality." The political equality imagined by the suffragists
involved full and equal participation in the public sphere. As Jane
Addams argued, the ballot would provide women with "natural
participation in civic life." Suffragists believed that the ballot would take
women out of the private sphere of the family and make them "member[s]
of the community."
Id. (citations omitted).
202. See also id. at 791 ("Historically, then, the Nineteenth Amendment is
'fundamentally about women's political participation.' This is consistent with the
republican idea that being a political citizen means more than just casting a vote; it
means active deliberation and participation in civic life."). Lawsky persuasively
argues that themes of republicanism were prevalent in the debate over adoption of
the Nineteenth Amendment. See id. at 788-92.
Law and Inequality
C. Vote Dilution, Popular Sovereignty, Representative
Government, and Article I
In Part II.A,203 we saw the way in which the Court
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to discover and articulate
a principle of one-person, one-vote. The Voting Cases thus held
that vote dilution violates the Constitution. The Court relied not
only on the specific command of the Constitution's Amendments,
but held that vote dilution violates the principles of popular
sovereignty and representative democracy. 204 Those principles
were intentionally incorporated into the government the Framers
created. This section discusses the ways in which Congress
embodies popular sovereignty and how that driving principle is
undercut by the concentration of power in the hands of the few.
In order to affect the will of the people as a whole, popular
sovereignty demands that each voting member have an equal
voice; all members must have an equal input. 20 5 If political power
is concentrated in the hands of the few, popular sovereignty is
thwarted. Several central features in the American republic206
embody popular sovereignty, pointing to the essential vision of
political equality in governance and rejecting concentration of
power and vote dilution. First and foremost, in a republic the
power derives from the people 20 7 and is effectuated by elected
representatives in government. In The Federalist No. 39, Madison
wrote:
[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that
name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or
indirectly from the great body of the people, and is
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure
for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to
such a government that it be derived from the great body of
203. See supra notes 120-152 and accompanying text.
204. See also infra Part III.B.3.
205. As held in the Voting Cases, each person gets one vote. If each person has
the same number of votes, voting equality is created.
206. The Framers created a government which often goes by the names
"representative democracy" and "republic." I use both terms in these pages. The
Framers also were not clear on the separation of the terms. See Akhil Reed Amar,
The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority
Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 758 (1994)
[hereinafter Amar, Central Meaning] ("In debates over the Constitution, republican
government was regularly contradistinguished from monarchy and aristocracy, but
rarely from democracy.").
207. See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1121 (6th rev. ed. 1988)
(defining a republic as "a state in which the supreme power rests in the body of
citizens entitled to vote and is exercised by representatives chosen directly or
indirectly by them').
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the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or favored
class of it .... It is sufficient for such a government that the
persons administering it be appointed, either directly or
indirectly, by the people .... 208
Rejecting other forms of government and drawing on numerous
examples, 20 9 the Framers chose a republic as the form of
government that left power in the hands of the people.
2 10
The people retain power through their selection of
representatives who use their best judgment to represent the
people, 211 while the people affirm or reject their representatives'
actions at regular intervals at the ballot box.212 As elected officials
208. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
209. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 100-01 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (reviewing "modern Europe"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 240
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (looking for "the distinctive characters
of the republican form [in] ... Holland ... Venice [and] Poland"); JOHN ADAMS,
Novanglus, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 43-44 (George A. Peek ed.,
1954) [hereinafter ADAMS, Nouanglus] (considering France and Spain and Great
Britain). Ancient civilizations were also considered. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No.
18, at 122 (James Madison with Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(examining ancient Greek examples); JOHN ADAMS, A Defense of the American
Constitutions, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 121 (George A. Peek
ed., 1954) [hereinafter ADAMS, Defense] (reviewing ancient German governments);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(examining "the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy").
210. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 433 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881) [hereinafter 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (statement of James Wilson). James Wilson explained:
There are three simple species of government-monarchy, where the
supreme power is in a single person; aristocracy, where the supreme power
is in a select assembly, the members of which either fill up, by election, the
vacancies in their own body, or succeed to their places in it by inheritance,
property, or in respect of some personal right or qualification; a republic or
democracy, where the people at large retain the supreme power, and act
either collectively or by representation.
Id. See also 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881)
(statement of Charles Pinckney). The North Carolina debates also provide an
example of the emphasis placed on the power of the government deriving from the
people. Id. at 9-11; see also id. at 11 (statement of Iredell) ("The people are
avowedly the fountain of all power."); id. at 10 (statement of MacLaine) ("The
people here are the origin of all power.").
211. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 209, at ("[Iun a democracy the
people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic they assemble
and administer it by their representatives.").
212. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) ("As long as ours is a
representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of
government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right
to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political
system."); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 30 (1849) (noting that "the people
are the source of all political power" but that, as the exercise of governmental
powers immediately by the people themselves is impracticable, they must be
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serve the people, the principles of popular sovereignty are
served. 213 Thomas Jefferson wrote: "[A] government is republican
in proportion as every member composing it has his equal voice in
the direction of its concern.., by representatives chosen by
himself... ,"214 In sum, popular sovereignty demands a
government which dervies power from, and effectively remains in,
the hands of the people via elected representatives. 215 Such a
exercised by representatives of the people; the basis of that representation is
suffrage).
213. John Adams wrote that the "Representative Assembly... should be in
miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason,
and act like them." JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in
4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 86-93 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch4s5.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2005). The Supreme Court has reinforced this over its history. See, e.g., In re
Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891) (noting that the republican form of government is
distinguished by "the right of the people to choose their own officers for
governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative
power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be
those of the people themselves .... "). Id. Recently, Justice O'Connor discussed the
importance of voting rights and her concern about situations in which "the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are
not equally open to participation by members ... in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice." Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
990 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For scholarly discussion and agreement, see,
e.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 22-
23 (1972) (explaining that popular sovereignty reflects the principle "that
government is founded on the consent of the governed and therefore should reflect
the will of the people .... [T]he people are the source of all power."); Amar, Central
Meaning, supra note 206, at 749 ('"The central pillar of Republican Government, I
claim, is popular sovereignty."); Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments
and Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
815, 816 (1994) ("Most scholars would agree that a republican government is, at the
very least, one in which the people control their rulers."). Some will respond that
this theoretical vision overlooks the clearly exclusive means and methods of the
American government. What of the three-fifths clause, property requirements, and
the exclusion of women from the franchise, as just the most clear examples? The
Framers created a structure that depended upon participation within the context of
a society that did not yet extend the vote widely. While the group of those who
participated was limited, as the nation has grown, fortunately prevailing norms,
beliefs, and attitudes have changed. Accordingly, through constitutional
amendment, the document now is highly inclusive in terms of its participants. See
supra Part II.B. But, the basic structure of inclusion remains the same. In other
words, the wisdom of the inclusive, participatory structure remains intact, but the
ignominious aspects of exclusion have been shed.
214. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON, POLITICAL WRITINGS 211 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds.,
1999) [hereinafter JEFFERSON WRITINGS].
215. This sentiment was repeated in the debate over the Fifteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Williams) ('To pretend to have a Government founded upon the
consent of the governed ..- and then to deny millions of citizens in this country any
part of that consent.. . is an inconsistency upon which a republican Government
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system cannot thrive if the people's power is diluted.
More than theory, the reality of American government is
instructive. Only one of the three branches of government-the
legislative branch-embodies the spirit of representative
democracy. Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment call for the
direct election, by the people of the individual states, of members
to the House 216 and Senate, 217 respectively. 2 8 By guaranteeing the
direct election of representatives by individual citizens, the
Constitution not only secures power in the hands of the people, but
also allows the people to delegate that authority to their elected
representatives. With its nearly equipopulous districts, the House
of Representatives embodies this principle even more than the
malapportioned Senate, because each State is represented equally,
regardless of population. 219  Nonetheless, in choosing their
senators, the people have equally distributed power, particularly
since the Seventeenth Amendment mandated direct election of
senators.
220
Ironically, we can see Article I's representative nature more
clearly by seeing where it is absent from the structure of
government. Article II and the Twelfth Amendment, which
outline the election process for the executive, remove power from
the hands of the people. 221 The Electoral College stands between
can hardly stand."). For the same basic perspective nearly fifty years later
debating women's, right to vote, see 52 CONG REC. 1437 (1915) (statement of Rep.
Bryan).
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second year by the People of the several States.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof .... ).
218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Article I, Section 2
calls for apportionment of Members of Congress according to population. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers . . ."). Particularly after the Seventeenth Amendment
provided for the direct election of Senators, this is even more clear. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof.) (modifying U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3.).
219. The Reynolds Court observed that the unique situation by which the
colonies and original states were "sovereign entities" brought together through
"compromise and concession" made this situation unique, not violative of the
principles announced in the Voting Cases. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574
(1964). Justice Stewart, dissenting in Lucas, pointed out this irony in relation to
the Voting Cases. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 747-
48 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
220. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
221. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII (creating and detailing
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the people and direct election of the president, 222 which can have a
the function of the Electoral College by using a malapportioned voting scheme
based on House and Senate representation).
222. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of.Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress."). All but two states choose electors on a winner-take-all basis. As the
majority controls all the Electoral College votes for that state, this winner-takes-all
aspect of the Electoral College moves the presidency farther from the people. See
ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, "Electoral College" (2003), available at
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576768/ElectoralCollege.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2005).
As of 2000, the District of Columbia and all states except Maine and
Nebraska had adopted the winner-take-all system. Under the winner-
take-all system, the electors assigned to the candidate who won most of the
vote in their state are all represented in the electoral college. Maine and
Nebraska, however, employ the district system. Under this system, two
electors are awarded to the winner of the statewide popular vote, and the
remaining electors are awarded to the popular vote winner in each of the
state's congressional districts.
Id.; see also Congressman James E. Clyburn, Electoral College Needs Reform,
CAPITOL COLUMN, available at http://www.house.gov/clyburn/cols/collll700a.htm
(Nov. 17, 2000) (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
Whoever wins the popular vote in the state, in turn gets all of its electoral
college votes. And that is true whether or not the highest popular vote-
getter wins by a margin of one vote or one million votes.... There are two
states that have made an exception to this rule-Maine and Nebraska.
The legislatures in these states have determined that electors will be
apportioned based on who wins each Congressional district in the state.
Id. In addition, the Electoral College grants individual votes of different states
disproportionate weights. As the majority controls all the Electoral College votes
for that state, this winner-takes-all aspect of the Electoral College moves the
presidency farther from the people. To determine the political weight of a single
vote cast, an equation can be developed from the number of Electoral College votes
given to a particular state, divided by the number of voting-age citizens in said
state (in millions). This would effectively be creating an Electoral College scale for
measurement. Thus, the higher the political weight, the more power that is held in
the hands of the individual state's voter. For example, in 2000, each citizen in
California, which has 55 electoral votes, had a political weight of 2.22, but each
citizen of Wyoming, which has 3 electoral votes, had a political weight of 8.57. For
population statistics from 2000, see U.S. Census, Reported Voting and Registration
of the Total Voting-Age Population, By Age, for States: November 2000, available
at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/voting/p20-542/tabO4b.pdf (last
visited Mar. 6, 2005). See also John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A
Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304, 324-25 (1968);
Michael Herz, Votes and Voices: Reevaluations in the Aftermath of the 2000
Presidential Election: How the Electoral College Imitates the World Series, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2002). Herz writes:
V]otes would only be of equal weight if electoral college votes were exactly
apportioned among the states, and then on the basis of those actually
casting ballots rather than population. But in fact electoral votes are
allocated by populations, which are not perfect multiples of 435; the rates
of registration and of voting vary from one state to another; each state,
regardless of size, gets two electoral votes (corresponding to its two
Senators) in addition to the electoral votes allocated by population
(corresponding to its Representatives). The result, as has often been
pointed out, is a wide variation in the weight of individual votes and a
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particularly cruel relation to representative democracy when
implemented. This was most recently evidenced in the 2000
presidential election when the president did not receive a majority
of the popular vote.223
Article III removes the judicial branch even further from the
people. Federal judges are most remote and least responsive to
the people, as the president appoints them with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 224 This is hardly a criticism; as the federal
judges are charged with the responsibility to interpret the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, 225 they have a
mandate that is not and should not be responsive to popular will
and sentiment. None of this is intended to denigrate the executive
or judicial branches; rather, it emphasizes that the legislative
branch-which, after all, is the law-making branch-most clearly
reflects the tenets of popular sovereignty and representative
democracy.
In sum, the structure of American government speaks to the
ideal of participatory equality. Vote dilution and its corollary,
concentration of political power, run directly contrary to this ideal.
The foundation of popular sovereignty honors equality of
participation from the electorate. The Congress is the most
responsive and political branch; its members are most clearly
accountable to the people. Article I can be most directly tied to the
people, and in some ways can be seen as most directly reflecting
and reinforcing equality in political participation. Power derives
from all the people; it should be distributed evenly and not rest
particular dilution of individual voting strength in large states. So in 2000
Vermont had 97,931 1/3 voters per elector; New York had 206,727 1/4
voters per elector. In this sense, a Vermonter's vote counted twice as much
as a New Yorker's. This also looks odd at best, if not, in the words of
Senator Durbin, "undemocratic and unfair."
Id.
223. In addition to President George W. Bush, Presidents John Quincy Adams,
Rutherford B. Hayes, and Benjamin Harrison were elected despite losing the
popular vote. See Wikipedia, U.S. Presidents Who Did Not Win Majorities in
Election, at http://academickids.com/encyclopedia/u_/u/u s-presidents_whodid
not win-majorities in elections.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005); University Press
of Kansas, Press Offers Books on Presidents Who Lost Popular Vote, available at
http:///www.ur.ku.edu/News/OON/NovNews/Novl61kspress.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2005).
224. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
225. For the seminal declaration of this power, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."). In particular, it is important for the judicial
branch to exist at the farthest point from political pressure, so that justice can be
administered as evenhandedly as possible.
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disproportionately in the hands of the few. 226
From any angle, we see the problem with vote dilution. It
concentrates power in the hands of the few, and thus runs counter
to the principles announced in the Voting Cases, the Constitution
and its amendments, and the fundamental spirit of American
representative democracy. First, in terms of Supreme Court
precedent, the Voting Cases: (1) rejected vote dilution and the
concentration of power that came with malapportionment, and (2)
established the one-person, one-vote principle. Further, an in-
depth review of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments
reaffirms the Court's holdings and reinforces a principle of
equality of political participation. Vote dilution and concentration
of power are also offensive to popular sovereignty and
representative government, as they contravene the notion of
making all the people the ultimate source of power.
Unfortunately, as we have seen, when power is concentrated in the
hands of the few, the wealthy possess inordinate influence and
access in politics and government. 227
III. A New Equality Approach to Campaign Finance Reform
The current problem of disproportionate power in the hands
of the wealthy few can be gainfully compared to the Voting Cases.
I propose here that we extend the ideas that supported the one-
person, one-vote rule to the problem of wealth-based inequality
that we find in campaign finance today. This new paradigm
requires a new analysis, with a focus on equality concerns. I shall
explore this approach and its implications before concluding the
Article.
A. Applying the Voting Cases to the Problem of Modern Vote
Dilution
In the beginning of this Article, I discussed the way in which
the modern political-governmental system concentrates power in
the hands of the few. 228 This, I suggest, is the modern-day
equivalent of vote dilution in the 1960s. Although the Voting
Cases and their underlying constitutional logic reject dilution and
concentration of political power, the question we confront today
extends beyond the one-person, one-vote principle to the broader
principles that underlie that declaration. In the Voting Cases, the
226. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 35-103 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 35-103 and accompanying text.
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Court responded to a particular problem and attached the label of
vote dilution, but dilution and concentration are two sides of the
same coin. 229 In speaking about vote dilution, the Court equally
rejected the concentration of power that had previously rested in
the hands of the few.230 Change comes, often slowly,231 and indeed,
after decades of struggle there is greater formal equality and
ensuring one-person, one-vote is largely a problem of the past. But
the modern vote dilution is just as pernicious. In this section I
argue for applying the lessons of the past to the problems of today.
I propose that we apply the Voting Cases and the
concomitant supporting principles of equality to the current
analysis of campaign finance reform. Today, formally speaking,
one-person, one-vote is the law and votes are weighted equally,
232
but the underlying principle is jeopardized. There is a
constitutional dimension to the current state of affairs, 233 one that
229. The Court specifically spoke in those terms in Gray and Reynolds. While
the voters in the more populous counties alleged that they had their votes diluted,
those in the less densely populated areas enjoyed a concentrated power. See
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 371, 379
(1963).
230. See supra notes 120-152 and accompanying text. In addition, before the
Voting Cases, malapportioned legislatures could be reelected with impunity; the
political process was broken because nobody could break through. The Constitution
mandated systemic change, and the Court responded. Ensuring that each person
could vote moved the nation forward. As seen in Part I.B, the wealthy maintain
disproportionate power, making it possible to monopolize power. See supra notes
35-103 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 2474 (1997). Fiss uses Reynolds to illustrate the theory of
legislative failure, writing: "Here the problem was not the absolute
disenfranchisement of some portion of the electorate but rather self-dealing by
legislators. They had used their offices to perpetuate the electoral system that had
brought them into power, a system not consistent with democratic principles." Id.
231. Achieving equality is like building a cathedral-a glorious project devoted
to the highest ideals that always seems to take centuries. The Constitution started
it, then came the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Amendments, followed by
the Voting Cases. But the cathedral is not finished.
232. Questions of chads, technology, and Florida in the 2000 presidential
election notwithstanding, this is the case. For a thorough review of many of those
issues, see, e.g., Bush v. Gore Symposium, 29 FL. ST. L. REV. 325 (2001).
233. I am making a modest claim. I do not argue that the current state of affairs
is per se unconstitutional under the Voting Rights cases and the Voting
Amendments. Instead, those cases illustrate a deep constitutional commitment to
equality in American politics and government. See supra notes 120-152 and
accompanying text. The current state of campaigns, politics, and government
violates that principle, because the few with money maintain a vastly
disproportionate power. See supra notes 35-103 and accompanying text. This
constitutional dimension could indeed form part of a successful claim that
campaign finance reform legislation survives strict scrutiny under Buckley and its
progeny. But more importantly for purposes of this Article, I simply want to
highlight the compelling nature of the problem and its constitutional dimension.
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is often overlooked. The Voting Cases apply to the basic problem
we face today. The Gray Court wrote that "one resident in Echols
County had an influence in the nomination of candidates
equivalent to 99 residents of Fulton County. 2 34 Similarly, for one
person to have ninety-nine times the influence of another by virtue
of money offends constitutional values. The problem is not only
that elected officials are taking into account others' interests; they
are systematically serving the interests of the few at the expense
of the many. 235 In the terms of Gray, the wealthy have many
times the influence of others.236
Equality is the common thread connecting the Voting
Amendments to the Constitution and the relevant case law. In
addition to their firm foundation in these sources, my arguments
about vote dilution, concentration of power, and equality grow out
of a philosophical principle 237 that, in the ideal, informs all
political-governmental systems. 238 Robert Dahl has written:
234. Gray, 372 U.S. at 371.
235. See supra notes 80-103 and accompanying text.
236. See Gray, 372 U.S. at 371. Exact numbers cannot be determined, but the
power concentrated in the hands of the wealthy few is certainly many times that of
the rest of the population, perhaps ninety-nine times or more.
237. Edward Foley has written an interesting article making the philosophical
claim that such egalitarianism ought to exist, and also specifically making no claim
as to whether it does in the context of the U.S. Constitution. See Edward B. Foley,
Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994).
238. While I believe that any legitimate political-governmental system must
place equality as the utmost priority, that is not enough. For example, Amartya
Sen has insightfully argued that simply using the term "equality" is perhaps too
facile, and does not solve many problems; instead, we must discuss, as he puts it,
"Equality of What?" AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 4 (1992).
Specifically, he argues that
the major ethical theories of social arrangement all share an endorsement
of equality in terms of some focal variable, even though the variables that
are selected are frequently very different between one theory and another.
It can be shown that even those theories that are widely taken to be
"against equality" ... turn out to be egalitarian in terms of some other
focus.
Id. at 3. My concern is not an equality of results-however that may be defined-
but rather an equality of access to the political and governmental processes that
ultimately control our daily lives. John Rawls and Robert Dahl are among the
leading theorists to emphasize the importance of equality in the political process.
But that equality is not easily defined and must be more than something as simple
as universal suffrage-merely protecting the right to vote does not ensure equality
of participation. The search for equality is not merely for equality on a formal
plane, but rather in a practical sense as well. See John Rawls, The Basic Liberties
and Their Priority, in EQUAL FREEDOM, SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 179 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995) ("Thus, what is fundamental is a political
procedure which secures for all citizens a full and equally effective voice in a fair
scheme of representation. Such a scheme is fundamental because the adequate
286
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[L]et me once again view democracy as, ideally at least, a
political system designed for citizens of a state who are willing
to treat one another, for political purposes, as political equals.
Citizens might view one another as unequal in other respects.
Indeed, they almost certainly would. But [in the ideal, they
should] assume that all citizens possess equal rights to
participate, directly or indirectly through their elected
representatives, in making the policies, rules, laws, or other
decisions that citizens are expected (or required) to
obey .... 239
Equality of participation is important not merely because it
provides the people with a sense of buy-in at one point in time-
i.e., at the voting booth-but it extends throughout the process of
governance. The more that people can be involved on an equal
footing in the process of governance, the more they can participate
in the process of governance. And the more the elected officials
witness and feel the participation of the people in the political
process, the greater sense they can have of the importance of
acting in the interest of the community and nation, rather than in
self-interest or in the interest of the few.240
John Rawls also aptly argued that "the constitution must
take steps to enhance the value of the equal rights of participation
for all members of society. It must underwrite a fair opportunity
to take part in and to influence the political process."241 I believe
that such is the case with the United States Constitution.
Admittedly, the Constitution is far from perfect; it was written,
after all, by humans, in an era where societal norms were quite
different, under conditions of compromise. 242  But it is
protection of other basic rights depends on it. Formal equality is not enough.").
While formal pronouncements of universal suffrage are powerful components and
reminders of the commitment to equality, they are not enough. As Rawls has
argued,
[tihe principle of equal liberty, when applied to the political procedure
defined by the constitution, I shall refer to as the principle of (equal)
participation. It requires that all citizens are to have an equal right to
take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process
that establishes the laws with which they are to comply.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 221 (1971).
239. ROBERT DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC Is THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 135-36
(2o03).
240. As I discussed in Part II.A.3., acting in the interest of the many is at the
heart of popular sovereignty and representative democracy. See supra notes 136-
152 and accompanying text.
241. RAWLS, supra note 238, at 224.
242. See THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 523-24 (Alexander Hamiliton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). Hamilton wrote:
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of
imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs, and to
expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments, in the
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instrumental, and provides a strong framework. Dahl has argued:
"I am going to suggest that we begin to view our American
Constitution as nothing more or less than a set of basic
institutions and practices designed to the best of our abilities for
the purpose of attaining democratic values. '243  Similarly, I
proceed from such an instrumental approach. As the American
legal-constitutional structure has protected against vote dilution,
it can be seen as more broadly protecting equality in political
participation and rejecting concentrated power.
But mine is far more than just a political-philosophical ideal,
for it has firm roots in case law: the Court has held that the
Constitution embraces the value of equality of participation and
rejects dilution and concentration of political power.244  The
concentration of power in the hands of those with money poses a
threat to constitutional values, as articulated in the Voting Cases,
and as embodied in the Constitution and its amendments. 245
Money in politics creates inequality in the American
representative democracy, but we have seen a commitment to
equality in the penumbras of the structure of the republic, the
Voting Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 246 A new approach is required to bring
chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work
from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies
must necessarily be a compound as well of the errors and prejudices, as of
the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed.
The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common
bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as many
dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such
materials?
Id.
243. DAHL, supra note 239, at 3; see also id. at 119 ("[A]t the very least, isn't it
time-well-past time-that we stop thinking of our Constitution as a sacred text
and begin to think of it as nothing more, or less, than a means for achieving
democratic goals?").
244. See supra notes 120-152 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 120-202 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 120-152 and accompanying text. This position has been
powerfully stated, in only a slightly more limited context, by Emma Coleman
Jordan:
Although the racial vote dilution cases have been justified on the basis of
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment more often than the [F]ifteenth, this is
surely wrong. One need only consider that protection from
unconstitutional dilution of the vote, characterized as the right to have
one's vote count equally with other voters, is a right which had to be
implied in Reynolds v. Sims from the penumbra of the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment. Thus, one must strain to drive the constitutional
justification for the racial dilution cases from the one-person-one-vote line
of authority.
Jordan, supra note 117, at 561. Of course, not surprisingly, the reference to
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this rich analytical tradition to bear on today's problem.
B. Implications of a New Paradigm: Broadening the
Buckley Analysis to Include (In)Equality
Equating the Voting Cases with the problems of today is just
the beginning. Having suggested a new approach with roots in the
Constitution and case law, the question remains: What are the
consequences of such a reconception? It would place questions of
equality of participation in governance as a prime inquiry into
whether campaign finance reform regulations are constitutional,
allowing such measures to target the specific inequalities that
present themselves due to the power of money in politics. 2 47
Before concluding the Article, I will explore several implications of
penumbras is reminiscent of another highly important case during the same era as
the Voting Cases, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
247. See, e.g., David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez Faire
in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & PoLY REV. 236, 243-44, 247-48 (1991); Foley,
supra note 237, at 1212-13, 1225-26; David Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and
Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1382-85 (1994). While this
Article is primarily concerned with suggesting a new way to conceive of the
problems presented, it does not present any specific legislative solutions. The
likely first major policy step would be toward public financing, and perhaps
spending caps. Raskin and Bonifaz also have aptly characterized a better way to
consider public financing. They write:
This article contrasts two opposing ways of financing the costs of running
for public office in a democracy. The first way is to treat such costs as the
candidate's personal problem, thereby requiring her either to spend her
own (or her family's) money on her campaign or to go to the largely
unregulated market in private campaign contributions to seek funds. This
is the way campaign costs in congressional elections are currently treated.
The second way is to treat the costs of running for office as a public
responsibility and make sufficient resources available to each qualified
candidate to run a serious and meaningful race.
Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative, supra note 122, at 1166-67. The
government could fund congressional campaigns at reasonable levels, so as to
reduce or eliminate the amount of money candidates need to raise. Further, to the
extent that people want to contribute to campaigns, the government could provide
matching funds so as to maximize the impact of smaller donations and to de.
emphasize the impact of larger ones. Furthermore, the ban on soft money must be
vigilantly monitored and perhaps extended. But that is the income side. Another
fundamental change must come on the expenditure side. If the cost of running
campaigns comes down, the need for money also dissipates. Accordingly, one of the
most important steps to take is to eliminate the biggest budget line in big
campaigns: advertising. The government, through licensing and incentives, should
require broadcasters to provide free air time to candidates. Most notably, this
would change the nature of campaign financing in terms of television advertising.
BCRA has moved us down this path, but there are many large steps to take. The
underlying point is that we have seen that money concentrates power in the hands
of the few, at the expense of the many. This is our modern-day vote dilution.
Changing the nature of campaign financing can change this concentration and
dilution of power.
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applying the Voting Cases to campaign finance reform and placing
the analytical emphasis on (in)equality.
1. Quid Pro Quo Corruption is Not the Only Compelling
Governmental Interest
First, of course, I am suggesting a shift in the prevailing
analysis of campaign finance reform measures. Buckley requires
campaign finance regulations to be closely drawn to meet a
sufficiently important state interest. 248 Buckley set the stage for
what has followed, 249 focusing narrowly and almost exclusively on
quid pro quo corruption as the quintessential compelling
governmental interest: "To the extent that large contributions are
given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined. '2 °5 0 Buckley held that either actual
corruption or the appearance thereof would provide a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest to justify restrictions. 25 1
Accordingly, corruption, in a quid pro quo sense, is the analytical
touchstone. But this alone is limiting. There is a far broader
concern that can be overlooked under the prevailing framework.
McConnell rejected this narrow vision25 2 and opened the door
to the possibility of a broader reading of corruption that would
satisfy strict scrutiny:
Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid
pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide
issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies,
but according to the wishes of those who have made large
financial contributions valued by the officeholder. Even if it
occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue
influence is manifest. And unlike straight cash-for-votes
transactions, such corruption is neither easily detected nor
practical to criminalize. 25 3
Building from this point,. I suggest an additional meaning and
focus on the values that animate campaign finance reform: we
248. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
249. Buckley has held a fast grip on ensuing analysis. See supra notes 107-109
and accompanying text.
250. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
251. Id. at 27.
252. The majority rejected dissenting Justice Kennedy's "crabbed view of
corruption, and particularly of the appearance of corruption, [which] ignores
precedent, common sense, and the realities of political fundraising exposed by the
record in this litigation." McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n., 540 U.S. 93, 152
(2003).
253. Id. at 153.
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must look at equality, as articulated in the Voting Cases, as a
compelling governmental interest.
In other words, we need to break out of the Buckley box. 254
McConnell gives us the chance to do so, and the Voting Cases and
the values they articulated will get us there. As discussed in these
pages, the Voting Cases contain a constitutional command against
the concentration of political power in the hands of the few.255 The
force of money in politics corrupts the system in a fundamental
way that is more pernicious than a crabbed reading of Buckley
would understand. Thus, I suggest a post-McConnell equality
value to drive reformers, legislators, and courts. Accordingly, any
Buckley analysis going forward would ask not merely whether the
regulation in question was narrowly tailored to prevent corruption
or the appearance thereof in a limited quid pro quo sense. The
new analysis would also weigh whether the challenged measure
appropriately serves the goals of increasing equality and reducing
the concentration of power in the hands of the few, as articulated
in the Voting Cases. 256
2. Participation Occurs in the Marketplace of Ideas, Not
the Marketplace of Money
This new paradigm poses a challenge to the status quo to the
extent that it would re-orient the discussion away from market
analyses that feed inequalities based on wealth. The traditional
response to campaign finance reform, often leaning heavily on
market analyses, reflects a conception of the First Amendment
protecting a marketplace of ideas. 257 If speech is given protection,
the argument goes, then ideas can flow freely. When ideas can
flow freely, the better ones can rise and the lesser ones can fall
according to their own merit. The best ones will survive, and the
truth-if there is such a thing-will triumph. As Justice Holmes
famously argued, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
254. I have previously suggested breaking out of the Buckley box, arguing that
the Guarantee Clause can animate the debate. See Alexander, supra note 106, at
821-22.
255. See supra notes 115-227 and accompanying text.
256. I do not suggest lessening the strict scrutiny required when regulating First
Amendment activity, but rather having a different conception of what goes on the
governmental interest side of the balance.
257. John Stuart Mill was a leading proponent of this idea, arguing against
government regulation, as it could ultimately impede the search for "truth." See
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (David Spitz ed., 1975).
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thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."258
This conception relies on the idea that each person must be
allowed to participate freely in this marketplace, leading its
adherents to argue against most government regulation of political
speech. 259 Not surprisingly, the First Amendment marketplace of
ideas metaphor has found its way into many campaign finance
reform opinions. 260 Most recently, for example, Justice Thomas
dissented in McConnell:
The very "purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail." Yet today the fundamental principle that
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market," is cast aside in the
purported service of preventing "corruption," or the mere
"appearance of corruption." Apparently, the marketplace of
ideas is to be fully open only to defamers... pornographers,
flag burners, and cross burners. 261
While the First Amendment analysis is highly valuable, 262 a
larger point is lost when we engage the market analogy. This
marketplace is one best for ideas, not one for money. To the extent
258. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
259. For interesting perspectives on this argument, see, e.g., Martin Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982); Harry H. Wellington, On
Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130-32 (1979). Compare Frederick
Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699 (1991),
with Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 745 (1991)
(responding to Schauer's argument that truth and knowledge at times are
undesirable).
260. See e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 646
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("For instance, if the
Democratic Party spends large sums of money in support of a candidate who wins,
takes office, and then implements the Party's platform, that is not corruption; that
is successful advocacy of ideas in the political marketplace and representative
government in a party system."); Fed. Election Comm'n. v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) ("Direct corporate spending on political activity raises
the prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to
provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace."); Citizens Against Rent
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) ('The
Court has long viewed the First Amendment as protecting a marketplace for the
clash of different views and conflicting ideas. That concept has been stated and
restated almost since the Constitution was drafted."); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 809-10 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("[Corporate] expenditures may
be viewed as seriously threatening the role of the First Amendment as a guarantor
of a free marketplace of ideas.").
261. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 265 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted); see also id. at 286
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
262. See generally Mark C. Alexander, Attention Shoppers: The First Amendment
in the Modern Shopping Mall, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1999) (analyzing the
constitutional rights of free speech in private shopping malls).
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that finance dictates what ideas are considered, it is no longer a
marketplace of ideas. When we discuss ideas as if they are pure
commodities to be bought and sold, that takes us away from the
ideals of robust political interchange. 263 Thus, my proposal to
focus on wealth-based inequalities ideally would help place a
greater focus on the value of the ideas themselves, rather than the
moneyed interests who believe in and finance such ideas.
Taken from another perspective, consider a lingering tension
that stems from the question: What is the great driving force of
the United States? Two answers vie for acceptance, and each has
great merit. On the one hand, ours is a nation built on free
market economics, while on the other, the United States is a prime
example of a modern representative democracy. No doubt, both
forces are at work and can live in peaceful coexistence, but at
times they come into great tension with one another. The tension
is greatest when we think about the force of money in politics and
government. 264 In the market economy, money talks, and politics
and government are no exception. 26 But with all this talk of
markets, the debate can gravitate more easily to the conclusion
that politics must remain as unregulated as possible, and perhaps
only regulated to prevent such evils as bribery of public officials.
266
As a result, this compelling constitutional dimension can get lost.
While wealth and market analysis do not necessarily concern
themselves with egalitarianism, the re-conception I present would
263. Margaret Radin criticizes commodifcation, i.e., the process by which market
analogies dominate analysis of complex problems, including politics and free
speech. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 165 (1996).
264. This has been the subject of various scholarly inquiries. See, e.g., Pamela S.
Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1698 (1999) ("My object in
this Article is to discuss how talking about politics in market terms usefully
illuminates problems in election law and how it obscures or distorts them."); Daniel
R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV.
893, 895 (1998) ("Reform arguments all rest on a single fear: that, left to
themselves, various political actors will transform economic power into political
power and thereby violate the democratic norm of equal political empowerment.");
cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Market Failures and Failures of Markets, 85 VA. L. REV.
1745, 1746 (1999). Levinson writes:
I fear that politics, like grammar, will resist mixed metaphors. Contests
between market and nonmarket metaphors will more likely reenact
conflicts in our most deeply held political commitments, and there is no
reason to expect that conflicts at this level will resolve themselves
dialectically into a stable, incompletely commodified synthesis.
Id.; see Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative, supra note 122, at 1161-62
("[T]he recurring political impulse toward campaign finance reform in the
twentieth century reflects a basic tension between a private market economy and a
modern democratic polity.").
265. See supra notes 35-103 and accompanying text.
266. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
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enable a shift in perspective.
3. Power Vacuum: Creating Space for the Power of
Meaningful Political Participation
Money is the force of inequality that concentrates power
today, similar to the failure to redistrict diluted votes in the first
half of the twentieth century. Money drives candidates and
agendas. 267 The ideal I am suggesting likely could result in the
role of money, as a source of power, being diminished.268 If the
wealthy lose some power, a natural redistribution would follow. 269
The ensuing question would be: Where does the power shift, and
is that a problem?
First, let me be clear that no doubt, the wealthy will still
have power, and that is not, per se, a problem. The wealthy
always have and always will have great power in the United
States, often because of their beneficial role and ability to drive
and stimulate segments of the economy. But in the political
process, the problem is that the wealthy have power that is
strikingly disproportionate to their numbers solely because of their
wealth, for no reason other than that they can write a large check
to a candidate or political party. Equating money and speech
conflates everything. Having and giving money does express
support, but only to a marginal extent. 270 Right now, money
generates power and is confused with meaningful political
participation, 271 and that is troublesome.
As candidates and elected officials search for those who can
help them win elections, doubtless many will try to grab their
slice, and more, of the power pie. But if the wealthy no longer
control a super-sized portion, the pie will be redistributed to other
typical participants. The ideal encourages participation as the
touchstone for political power, and those who remain active
267. See supra notes 35-103 and accompanying text.
268. But the impact depends upon how legislators act in response to this
proposal, what laws are passed, what arguments are presented in legal challenges,
and ultimately how a court would respond to the argument presented in this
Article.
269. This is similar to the redistributive effect discussed earlier in the context of
the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. See supra notes 157-180 (discussing
the Fifteenth Amendment) and 181-202 (discussing the Nineteenth Amendment).
270. In Buckley the Court found only a "marginal restriction" on speech activity
when restricting contributions, because a "contribution serves as a general
expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate
the underlying basis for the support." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21.
271. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 87, at 2 (arguing that donations may be
seen as a form of political participation).
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participants in the system .can be the biggest beneficiaries of any
new paradigm. Some will always possess more power than others,
but what is required is an equitable basis for their greater power.
To the extent that any people or groups participate272 in the
electoral process, they will be able to "earn" their own power, not
with money, but rather via the participation that is essential to
the functioning of a healthy political-governmental system. 273 In
sum, if the power of the wealthy is reduced, a redistribution of
power will follow, and in the ideal, the beneficiaries will be those
who participate the most.274
4. A New Equality Argument: Established Precedent for
Evaluating Campaign Finance Reform
Finally, egalitarianism is not a new concept, so what is added
in these pages? Consider the Buckley dictum: "[T]he concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
272. Some examples will illustrate. To the extent that seniors, as a group,
typically vote at much higher rates than others, they would earn their share of the
political pie. And to the extent that they might have greater power under this new
conceptualization, others could have an equal chance to gain the same power, by
virtue of participation. Any group that has lower voting rates, such as young
voters, could effectively "buy in" to their increased power by virtue of greater
involvement in the process. Next, consider political organizers and organizations,
people who spend their time rallying groups of people around particular causes like
the environment, arms control, business development, or campaign reform. To the
extent that they organize and speak for people, these individuals perform an
informal representative function, effectuating popular sovereignty at the grass
roots. To the extent that they fulfill a role as an unofficial representative of people,
they too could earn the increased power they may achieve. If they do represent
others, ultimately, the power is spread among the many. As another example,
unions and their leaders already have much power in politics, and to the extent
that they represent people, again, that is fine, if they speak for their membership.
Similarly, local elected officials will carry their power perhaps to greater levels, to
the extent that the wealthy have less concentrated power. Local elected officials
are always a key to the success of federal campaigns, for the weight of their opinion
presumably will sway voters. And again, this power is appropriate, as the local
elected official enjoys the support of and is the official voice of countless voters. As
participation is encouraged, popular sovereignty is aided.
273. As the Reynolds Court wrote, "representative government is in essence self-
government through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and each
and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the
political process[ ] .... " Reynolds v. Sims, 277 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
274. I am not claiming that we will achieve some ideally defined utopian
equality. The equality that I am stressing is relative and not at all static. But the
bigger point is that we must move toward that ideal instead of accepting the status
quo that leaves so much power in the hands of the wealthy. The Constitution and
government of the United States embody a principle of equality in political
participation, and we should encourage and reward such participation.
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foreign to the First Amendment .. ,"275 Opponents of the quality
argument might claim that those words reject the equality idea
presented in these pages. 276 My response is straightforward:
Buckley did not even address the issue raised here, as the Court
did not consider the Voting Cases establishing the one-person, one-
vote rule. 277 While the Buckley Court did not accept certain
equality principles, 278 the McConnell Court opened the door for a
broader conception.279 I propose a different concern that the high
court should weigh in the balance. 28 0
275. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. Raskin and Bonifaz, calling that "the most
controversial and dubious statement in the Buckley opinion," counter: "the concept
which 'is wholly foreign to the First Amendment' is that which says that the First
Amendment includes the right to drown out the voices of others." Jamin Raskin &
John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
273, 320, 324 (1993) [hereinafter Raskin & Bonifaz, Wealth Primary].
276. Justices Thomas and Scalia, for example, have hung their dissenting hats
on that phrase on numerous occasions. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't. Political
Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 422 n.8 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 685 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas's
McConnell dissent).
277. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 n.55. The Court was speaking to a specific
question of whether the First Amendment required both sides of a debate to be
heard more or less equally. The "voting cases" that the Court weighed were those
that "invalidat[ed] governmentally imposed wealth restrictions on the right to vote
or file as a candidate for public office," i.e., cases striking poll taxes and certain
filing fees, but not the Voting Cases discussed in this Article, which were not cited
at all by the majority, and only once in the hundreds of published pages of opinions.
See id.
278. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at. 48-49. See also Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REv. 1405, 1407 (1986). Fiss aptly argues that the
received Free Speech Tradition was the problem in many cases, and that the choice
between Liberty and Equality was false, in a sense.
[Alt issue was not simply a conflict between equality and liberty, but also
and more importantly, a conflict between two conceptions of liberty. The
battle being fought was not just Liberty v. Equality, but Liberty v. Liberty,
or to put the point another way, not just between the [F]irst [A]mendment
and the Equal Protection Clause, but a battle within the [F]irst
[A]mendment itself.
Id. My argument does not deny this; rather, it also tries to re-define the Liberty v.
Equality equation.
279. See supra notes 252-256 and accompanying text.
280. From that point, future reform legislation is up to reform advocates,
legislators, and judges. Some have attacked an equality-based approach as being
driven not by equality but by political motivation and content preferences. See,
e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1051 (1996) (arguing that
campaign reform efforts, which "inherently favor certain political elites, support
the status quo, and discourage grassroots political activity" ultimately "would have
an undemocratic effect on American elections"). That criticism, while perhaps
applying to specific proposals, has no foundation here: this Article's goal is not to
write a law at all, much less one that favors any individual or party. That is not to
say that I do not have preferences for certain policy outcomes. Legislators and
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The issue of equality is not new to supporters of reform
either. Many writers and reformers have argued for reform from
an egalitarian perspective. 28' Raskin and Bonifaz in particular
place an additional emphasis on wealth disparities and the
Fourteenth Amendment, arguing in one article:
The real issue is constitutional: whether we will have a more
or less democratic government. The purpose of campaign
finance reform should be to fashion a system in which electoral
and governmental decision-making is based on the
participation, deliberation and interests of all citizens rather
than on the awesome wealth of the few.2 8 2
I fully agree, but their work, while compelling, is incomplete.
What I bring to the table that other egalitarian scholars have not
is the specific call of the Voting Cases and their roots. While
philosophers, scholars, judges, and politicians have long debated
equality, politics, forms of government, campaigns and reform, this
Article adds concrete and well-established precedent to show the
compelling nature of this particular equality.
No doubt there are myriad implications of what I am
proposing, but these are the primary concerns and responses
meriting attention here. In addition, there remains an unknown
next layer of implications, for ultimately, I propose a new way of
looking at this problem. The analysis of a specific regulation will
depend on its contents. In the end, I propose that analysis will
consider equality of participation in the political process, with its
foundation in the Voting Cases, the Constitution, and its
amendments, and in the greater context of representative
reformers are invited to take up the invitation as they move forward. But my point
in these pages is to illuminate the problem of the concentration of power in the
hands of the few and to add a new dimension to the analysis of that problem.
281. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the
First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (1999) ("Unless and until political
equality re-enters the picture as a permissible reform goal, I see no way out of the
current, unsatisfactory situation."); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1392-93 (1994) ("In democratic
politics, a norm of equality is important: disparities in wealth ought not lead to
disparities in power over government."). For an excellent synthesis of various
themes of reform, see Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion
and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. 987, 995 (2002) ("[I]dentifiable themes
appear throughout the scholarship of many Reformers. The most important of
these themes relate to equality, the relative nature of rights, the uneven
distribution of property, and the role of campaign finance in the larger political
process.").
282. Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative, supra note 122, at 1163; see
also Raskin & Bonifaz, Wealth Primary, supra note 275, at 279 (declaring that
"[t]he purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that the current campaign finance
regime is inconsistent with equal protection or, at the very least, warrants
congressional action to vindicate equal protection").
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democracy and popular sovereignty.
Conclusion
This Article is concerned with the ways in which money in
politics concentrates power in the hands of the wealthy few. To
demonstrate my point, I reviewed contribution patterns, indicated
where the money comes from, and showed that it distorts the
political-governmental process. 283 This review of the power of
money in politics connected the vote dilution of the 1960s with the
concentration of political power in the hands of the wealthy today.
In these pages I have proposed a new analogy, and a new way of
thinking about that problem. This paradigm starts with the
Voting Cases, in which the Supreme Court pronounced the one-
person, one-vote rule and rejected the dilution of the vote and its
corollary, concentration of power. 28 4 The Court had been asked to
analyze the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. It
did so, and it went beyond, drawing from the structure and theory
of government and the Voting Amendments, all of which embrace
a concept of equality of participation in the political process. 28 5
Accordingly, I suggest that there is an undervalued constitutional
dimension to the problem of money in politics. Campaign finance
reform can help eliminate money as the force of inequality that it
is today, but it is most important to shift the way we think about
this field. The concentration of power in the hands of the wealthy
few has a compelling constitutional dimension that must be
incorporated into campaign finance reform analysis.
283. See supra notes 35-103 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 120-152 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 128-227 and accompanying text.
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